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Legislation and Legitimation:
Congress and Insider Trading in the 1980s
Abstract
Orthodox corporate law-and-economics holds that American corporate and
securities regulation has evolved inexorably toward economic efficiency. That position is
difficult to square with the fact that regulation is the product of government actors and
institutions. Indeed, the rational behavior assumptions of law-and-economics suggest
that those actors and institutions would tend to place their own self-interest ahead of
economic efficiency. This article provides anecdotal evidence of such self-interest at
work. Based on an analysis of legislative history—primarily Congressional hearings—
this article argues that Congress had little interest in the economic policy effect of insider
trading legislation in the 1980s. Rather, those laws were motivated primarily bya desire
to legitimate the existing political and economic order.
The policy and doctrinal grounds for prohibiting insider trading are unclear. Yet
Congress devoted a great amount of attention to increasing the penalties for insider
trading in the 1980s. Meanwhile, more serious economic issues went unaddressed. What
explains this odd focus? Congress routinely explains corporate and securities legislation
as motivated by a need to bolster “investor confidence” and protect the capital formation
process. In the 1980s, legislators argued that insider trading scandals were undermining
investor confidence. That argument is unconvincing, however, because those scandals
were contemporaneous with unprecedented stock prices.
An alternative explanation for the 1980s legislation is that Congress sought
political legitimacy: not “investor confidence” in the markets, but “voter confidence” in
the political-economic system. Our government has a symbiotic relationship with a
capitalist system under which the power of business and finance sometimes rivals that of
the state. This arrangement is acceptable to most voters during prosperous times, but can
undermine the legitimacy of the political-economic system in times of perceived
economic crisis. Government crafts its responses to such crises to protect its legitimacy.
The process of self-legitimation does not consist merely of responding to exogenous
preferences of constituents. It also includes attempts to mold constituents’ preferences to
be more consistent with the self-interest and problem-solving abilities of Congress.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The 1980s were a time of unsettling transition in the American economy. The
U.S. economy suffered a severe recession early in the decade. American manufacturing
industries went into decline and succumbed to foreign competition. Hostile takeovers
changed the face of industry and corporate finance. Inflation, high interest rates, and
unemployment created economic uncertainty for a large segment of the public. The
subsequent recovery was accompanied by a new deregulatory philosophy in Washington,
tax cuts for the wealthy and a soaring stock market, which increased real and perceived
disparities in wealth. During this time, Congress devoted a significant amount of time to
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addressing a narrow aspect of securities regulation—insider trading. Congress passed
insider trading legislation in both 1984 and 1988. Between 1986 and 1988, it held four
sets of hearings specifically devoted to insider trading, and raised the subject in hearings
devoted to other securities law topics. Legislators repeatedly suggested that insider
trading in the 1980s constituted a crisis on par with the stock market crash of 1929. This
article asks why Congress was so preoccupied with insider trading. An important part of
the answer is Congress’ need to legitimate itself in the eyes of the American public
during a time of economic uncertainty. The need for legitimacy is an underexamined
aspect of Congress’ relationship to Wall Street and the economy, and of Congress’
response to real or perceived crises in general.
American legal scholars tend to subscribe to what Robert Gordon has referred to
as the “evolutionary-functionalist” account of legal change: “that the natural and proper
evolution of a society… is towards the type of liberal capitalism seen in the advanced
Western nations, and that the natural and proper function of a legal system is to facilitate
such an evolution.”1 Evolutionary-functionalists see this not only as a “natural and
proper” path, but also as an accurate description of American legal history.
The neoclassical law-and-economics revolution has championed a specific kind of
evolutionary functionalism in corporate and securities law. It holds that legal change
should be, and for the most part is, a matter of business and economic conditions pushing
the law in an economically efficient (i.e., liberal and capitalist) direction. Easterbrook
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Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 57 (1984). As Gordon points out,
“[t]he words "natural" and "proper" stress the normative nature of the theory; deviations from the norm are
both atypical and bad.” Id.

2

LEGISLATION AND LEGITIMATION
and Fischel and Roberta Romano advocate especially strong forms of this argument.2
Hansmann and Kraakman, two commentators not associated with the neoclassical camp,
advanced their own strong version of this argument when they declared that American
shareholder capitalism represents the “end of history for corporate law.” American
corporate law, in their view, has reached a final, perfected form that other countries can
do little more than imitate.
Although social science abandoned this kind of normatively loaded story of social
“progress” long ago, legal scholars, and especially corporate legal scholars, have
continued to cling to it.3 Some commentators may argue that more, less, or different
regulation is necessary for optimum efficiency, but most agree to a great extent with the
descriptive account and implicitly accept the normative account. Of course, much work
has been done to pose alternate explanations for legal change. Mark Roe, for example,
has argued that “The modern corporation’s origin lies in technology, economics, and
politics.” 4 According to Roe, American law’s preference for relatively small,
decentralized shareholders was at least in part a political response to a cultural bias
against concentrated economic power in general and large financial institutions in
particular. Roe argues that populist political ideology and the interests of an important
constituent group (small financial institutions) coincided, creating enough pressure to
push Congress to restrict the role of large financial institutions in corporate finance.

2

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW
(1991); ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993).
3
Gordon, supra note -- at 68.
4
MARK ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE
FINANCE (1994); Mark Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10
(1991).
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This article also posits a “political” description of developments in securities law.
But while Roe’s analysis focuses on politicians’ responses to the demands of
constituents, I focus on a different concern of politicians: institutional self-legitimation—
that is, the legitimation of Congress and of the American government generally, including
its symbiotic relationship with capitalism. Any institution must justify its existence and
the power it wields. Thus, in addition to pleasing constituents and serving the “public
interest,” one of the functions of Congress and its members is to legitimate and thereby
perpetuate itself as an institution.
Current scholarly commentary pays little attention to legitimation per se. Most
legal scholars, as well as many political scientists, view Congress as a frictionless conduit
for the implementation of its constituents’ demands.5 Some see Congress as a conduit for
the complex interests of “the public,” while some see it as catering to the wealthy and
powerful classes,6 or to those constituent subgroups (“special interest groups”) with the
most organized lobbying or deepest pockets. In this vein, corporate law scholars tend to
assume corporate and securities laws are mostly efficient responses to economic
conditions or, occasionally, the result of rent-seeking machinations by special interests.
Just as neoclassical corporate-law-and-economics assumes that securities markets
efficiently express the interests of investors, the view of Congress as conduit assumes
Congress (the product of political “markets”) efficiently expresses the interests of its
constituents. This assumption underemphasizes a phenomenon familiar to the layman:

5

See DAVID R. MAYHEW, AMERICA’S CONGRESS: ACTIONS IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE, JAMES MADISON
THROUGH NEWT GINGRICH (2000).
6
See, e.g., MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977); Gordon,
supra note --, at 74-75.
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legislators’ considerable autonomy.7 Richard Fenno famously characterized legislators as
rational actors seeking “re-election, influence in the House, and good public policy,” as
well as “private gain.”8 If legislators are viewed as agents, “good public policy” is in the
interest of their principals, while energy devoted to the other goals, to the extent that they
do not contribute to improving policy,9 is a form of agency cost. Institutional selflegitimation is one such cost. While this cost is somewhat mitigated by elections,
political “markets” are rife with obvious anti-competitive factors: incumbent advantages,
financial barriers to entry, the party system, districting rules, and so on.
Relying on Congressional hearings, this article reads the story of insider trading
legislation of the 1980s as an example of the legitimation process. This Article will
proceed as follows. Part II summarizes the two major pieces of 1980s insider trading
legislation, the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and the Insider Trading and
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988. Part III expands upon this Article’s political
theory of law. The recession and the government response to it—deregulation and
supply-side economics—invited doubts about the capitalist order and the government’s
role in it. To defend its legitimacy, Congress attempted to remake the concept of insider
trading into a symbol of Americans’ pessimism about the economy.10
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MAYHEW, supra note --, at 12-13
RICHARD FENNO, CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES 1 (1973). Critics of rational choice theory may argue
that lawmakers’ motivations are more psychologically complex. William T. Bianco, Understanding
Presentation of Self, in CONGRESS ON DISPLAY, CONGRESS AT WORK 217, 217 (William T. Bianco, ed.,
2000). But in either case, legislators are not mere vehicles of constituent interests.
9
Other than private gain these goals can of course serve constituents as well, since re-election and
influence are necessary to influencing public policy.
10
In linguistic terminology, “metonymy” is the figurative representation of one concept with the term for
another, associated concept. For example, a U.S. Presidential administration is often referred to by the
related term “the White House. Thus we might say Congress constructed insider trading as a metonym that
stood for America’s economic uncertainty. As we shall see, Congress also contributed to the notion that
insider trading was a concept associated with American economic problems.
8
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Part IV presents evidence from the hearings to support this argument. In hearings
on insider trading, many legislators suggested that it was the biggest problem on Wall
Street. Congressional Democrats tied insider trading to larger policy issues such as
hostile takeovers, which they had tried, but failed, to regulate. Having symbolically
reduced America’s economic problems to one relatively simple issue, Congress could
address the issue in a decisive way to show its authority and competence. Insider trading
was a particularly useful symbol. First, it allowed Congress to express disapproval of the
excesses of capitalism without criticizing capitalism per se. Second, a law-enforcement
problem like insider trading is concrete and dramatic.11 America’s underlying economic
problems were hard to identify and explain, and much harder to solve. Framing the
economic situation as a law-enforcement issueallowed Congress to portray itself as the
“good guy” against identifiable “bad guys.” Moreover, the reframing gave Congress a
problem that was ostensibly amenable to simple solutions: increased penalties and
enforcement resources.

II. THE 1980s INSIDER TRADING LEGISLATION
In 1982, the SEC proposed legislation that would allow it to seek civil penalties of
up to three times actual trading profits in insider trading cases. In 1984, Congress passed
the treble-damages rule as part of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act (ITSA). ITSA also
increased the maximum criminal fine for Exchange Act violations to $100,000.12 Over
11

I use the term “law-enforcement problem” rather than “crime” because insider trading is punishable both
as a crime and as a civil offense. As will be seen, the 1980s legislation increased both criminal and civil
penalties for insider trading.
12
The maximum penalty had been $10,000 since the passage of the Exchange Act in 1934. Insider Trading
Sanctions and SEC Enforcement Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 559 Before the Subcomm. on
Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th
Cong. 29-30 (1983) (hereinafter H.R. Ser. No. 98-33).
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the next few years, a number of high-profile insider-trading scandals came to light. The
cases—most notably those involving Dennis Levine, Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken—
suggested that ITSA had been insufficient to deter insider trading. In response, the House
held hearings on insider trading in June and July 1986.13 Insider trading became a central
preoccupation of Congressional hearings on the securities markets for the next few years.
Congress passed the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act
(ITSFEA) in October 1988. ITSFEA amended the sanctions for insider trading in three
ways. First, it extended ITSA’s penalty provisions to “control persons” of an insider
trader if the control person acted in a “knowing or reckless” manner.14 Second, it
increased the maximum individual criminal fine under the securities laws (which ITSA
had recently increased from $10,000 to $100,000) to $1 million and the maximum jail
term to 10 years. The fine for “non-natural persons” was increased to $2.5 million.15
Third, it gave parties that trade in a security contemporaneously with the insider trader a
private cause of action against the insider trader.16
In addition to increasing maximum sanctions, ITSFEA also offered informants a
“bounty” in the amount of 10% of civil penalties recovered from insider traders
apprehended on the basis of the informant’s information. ITSFEA further required
broker-dealers and investment advisers to establish procedures “reasonably designed…to
prevent the misuse…of material, nonpublic information.” The law empowered, but did
not require, the SEC to establish rules in furtherance of this provision. ITSFEA also
13

Insider Trading: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and
Finance of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d sess. (1986) (hereinafter H.R. Hr. 99168).
14
Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act § 21A(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. 78u-1.
15
Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. 78ff. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 further raised these penalties to $5 million and 20 years for individuals and $25 million for nonnatural persons.
16
Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act § 20A, 15 U.S.C. 78t-1.
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authorized the SEC to conduct investigations in response to a foreign government’s
request for assistance. A further provision of ITSFEA directed the SEC to conduct a
study to update the landmark 1963 “Special Study” of the securities markets. In addition
to some very broad instructions about the coverage of the study, this provision
specifically required attention to insider trading. Congress did not appropriate the funds
for the study, however, and it was never conducted.
ITSFEA also instructed the SEC to make recommendations for new legislation
regarding its power to impose sanctions for other securities law violations. The SEC did
so, and in 1990, Congress enacted many of these recommendations in the Securities
Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act (the “Remedies Act”). The
Remedies Act specifically authorized federal courts to impose civil penalties on securities
law violations other than insider trading. But even after the Remedies Act, the potential
civil liability for insider trading greatly exceeded, and still exceeds, that for other
securities law violations.17
Congressional hearings on the legislation served a major research resource for this
article. The institutional characteristics of Congress further undermine the “conduit”
theory of Congressional action described above. The legislature is a complex
bureaucratic institution. Congress (the House in particular) is highly decentralized.
Much of the political science commentary on Congress focuses on how its diffuse,
committee-based structure makes it hard to set big-picture policy agendas. According to
17

The Remedies Act expanded the SEC’s penalty power in insider trading cases and other cases by
authorizing it to issue cease and desist orders and to seek court orders barring violators of §17 and §10(b)
(which includes insider trading violations) from serving as directors and officers. Although the Remedies
Act extended SEC civil monetary penalties to securities law violations other than insider trading, insider
trading remained the only violation subject to ITSA’s trebling provision and ITSFEA’s “control person”
liability and $1million maximum fine. (The maximum civil penalty under the Remedies Act was the greater
of $100,000 or actual gain.)
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two prominent political scientists, “In large part, the history of the House has been a
struggle to mold a coherent policy-making instrument out of a large and disparate
collectivity. It has been, one might say, a struggle of the general versus the particular, in
which the particular seems the more powerful force.”18
Congress ostensibly holds hearings to inform the lawmaking process, but they are
poorly suited for gathering information.19 Legislators’ attendance and attention are
spotty. “Witnesses” tend to read from prepared testimony. Questioning rarely constitutes
a sophisticated exchange among legislators and witnesses. Instead, “while one member
asks questions his colleagues assume an attitude of benign interference.”20 Furthermore,
although witnesses may present differing views, there is rarely interaction among
witnesses. Congressional hearings serve purposes other than information gathering,
however:
Hearings are public events and serve public purposes. Even though
hearings may be poorly attended, they will be studied carefully by
interested publics and specialized journalists. Hence, the participants—
legislators no less than witnesses—must pay attention to the impact their
words will have. Their purposes include personal advertisement, seeking
publicity for their views, reminding influential constituents that they are
on the job, and building a public record in support of a given course of
action. A freewheeling, open-ended exchange would not serve these
purposes as fully as does a more structured performance….21

The 1980s hearings on insider trading and related issues conform to this
description. As will be discussed below, legislators placed far more emphasis on
expressing their preconceived viewpoints than in eliciting information. Traditional
analyses of legislative history view legislation as an exercise of realpolitik, public choice,
18

ROGER H. DAVIDSON & WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESS AGAINST ITSELF 19 (1977).
DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note ---, at 82.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 82-83.
19
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and rational and strategic behavior. Shortly after the passage of ITSFEA a Congressional
insider wrote a detailed description of the drafting and passage of ITSFEA.22 That
account portrayed the legislative process as a series of practical political compromises
among legislators and regulators with differing opinions on how to solve a common
policy problem. That approach illuminates how Congress produced legislation once it
determined that insider trading was a problem worthy of attention, and that a penaltyfocused response was appropriate. But it does not ask how Congress made those
determinations. It does not examine the role of Congress in constructing the crisis, or the
legitimating and expressive function of the hearings and legislation. This article addresses
those issues, focusing on the hearings as rhetorical exercises rather than following the
evolving drafts as policy compromises. Admittedly, this approach, too, reveals only one
aspect of the legislative process, but it is one that is insufficiently explored.

III. LEGISLATION AND LEGITIMATION
1. The Problem: Government and Capitalism
In the United States, as in all capitalist countries, government and capitalism are
highly interdependent. This interdependence can create suspicion that the government
puts the interests of business and the wealthy ahead of the general public. Thus
government in a capitalist system must periodically distance itself from capitalism in
order to maintain its legitimacy and defend itself against charges that it has been

22

Stuart J. Kaswell, An Insider’s View of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of
1988, 45 BUS. LAW. 145 (1989). Kaswell served as Minority (i.e., Republican) Counsel to the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce.
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captured.23 This is particularly true when average voters are plagued by economic fears,
as they were in the l970s and 1980s. To avoid challenging the foundations of the
economic and political order, however, government must distance itself from capitalism
without disparaging capitalism per se or wealth per se. Condemning the excesses of
capitalism strikes this balance. It legitimates the government as an independent keeper of
order and legitimates market capitalism as a system whose unfairnesses are subject to
occasional corrections by an independent government.24 Thus insider trading was a
politically useful symbol of America’s complex economic anxieties. It gave Congress
the opportunity to condemn capitalism’s excesses, but not capitalism itself.
American economic uncertainty that began in the 1970s carried on into the 1980s
due to foreign competition, economic restructuring, and record inflation and
unemployment rates. Hostile takeovers drove the stock market upward, enriching a few,
while many observers (rightly or wrongly) blamed them for layoffs. Even though many
economic measures had recovered by the mid-1980s, economic fears lingered well into
the decade. Indeed, the unprecedented stock market recovery generated some populist
resentment, as it preceded the general economic recovery and stock ownership was less
widely dispersed than it is at present.
Economic uncertainty shakes public confidence not only in markets, but also in
the government’s ability to control social conditions—that is, it threatens the legitimacy
of the government. Politicians and regulators often speak of building “investor
23

Cf. TONY POVEDA, RETHINKING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 137 (1994). (Arguing that despite the “elite
power structure,” the government has an interest in prosecuting white collar crime because “the state must
sometimes make symbolic concessions to non-elites in order to maintain the stability and legitimacy of the
political system”).
24
Cf . Donald C. Langevoort, Managing the "Expectations Gap" in Investor Protection: The SEC and the
Post-Enron Reform Agenda, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1139, (2003) (arguing that securities regulation, by
ostensibly protecting investors from fraud, legitimates both the government and the markets).

11

LEGISLATION AND LEGITIMATION
confidence” in the markets and the economy generally. But the government also must
maintain “voter confidence” in the government itself. In times of economic uncertainty,
when the public questions the fairness of the capitalist system, the state needs a
legitimating ideology to explain its role vis à vis the financial markets and capitalism
generally. Thus, the state periodically mitigates its generally free-market position by
placing some regulations on the market. These regulations have consistently
incorporated a significant degree of so-called “self regulation” by the securities industry.
Thus the effect of these regulations is not to fundamentally remake the market system,
but rather to signal the state guarantees the fairness of the market. This process burnishes
the reputation of both the market and the state—not to mention the reputations of
individual politicians. The most obvious example of this process was the passage of the
New Deal federal securities laws. The purpose of this article is not to question the merits
of insider trading law, our securities regulation regime generally, or the government’s
good faith in relying upon self regulation. Rather, I wish to point out that the
government’s regulatory choices (whatever they may be) are inextricably tied up with the
legitimation and perpetuation of the government itself. 25
On close examination, the insider trading legislation of the 1980s does not appear
to be solely, or even primarily, about insider trading. The insider trading scandals of the
1980s presented Congress with an opportunity to argue to the American public that
capitalism is fair—or at least that Congress strives to make it so, and is not controlled by
the economic elite. For a government that is closely identified with capitalism and

25

Cf. Faith Stevelman Kahn, Bombing Markets, Subverting the Rule of Law: Enron, Financial Fraud, and
September 11, 2001, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1579, 1629-30 (2002) (“the [Enron] hearings gave members of
Congress a very public opportunity to attempt to reassert the authority of government and law over
seemingly corrupt, lawless corporate firms and capital market participants.”).
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sometimes suspected of favoring big business and the wealthy over the general public,
outlawing and prosecuting insider trading and other so-called “white-collar” crime can
serve as “a symbolic way of maintaining legitimacy.”26 I do not mean to suggest here
that economic elites call all the shots in Washington or that capitalism is an inherently
fraudulent system that can be sustained only by political shenanigans. The fact is that
government has an interest in maintaining the legitimacy of capitalism and government’s
symbiotic relationship with capitalism.27
In addition to the general need to prove it was not captured by business interests,
the Reagan Administration faced legitimacy concerns specifically related to securities
regulation and insider trading. Insider trading scandals emerged with regularity in the
1980s. Indeed, Reagan’s first term saw two insider trading scandals involving
Administration officials. Thomas Reed, a White House assistant for national security
affairs, resigned in 1983. He was later indicted on securities fraud charges. In 1984,
Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Thayer resigned when the SEC brought insider trading
charges against him. Congress passed ITSA that year. Thayer eventually served 19
months in prison for perjury and obstruction of justice. Insider trading thus gained
political salience and tarnished the legitimacy of the administration.
Insider trading scandals continued to emerge throughout the decade. A highprofile scandal involving Wall Street Journal stock recommendations surfaced in early
1984.28 The most infamous scandals—those involving Ivan Boesky and Michael
Milken—occurred after the passage of ITSA in 1984, setting the stage for ITSFEA. This
26

Tony G. Poveda, White-Collar Crime and the Justice Department: The Institutionalization of a Concept,
17 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE, 235, 237 (1992).
27
Whether that relationship is a malign conspiracy or a good-faith partnership for the good of society is a
debate well beyond the scope of this article.
28
See Carpenter v. U.S., 484 U.S. 18 (1987).
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may further explain why the Democratically controlled Congress was so interested in
insider trading. It may also help explain why the deregulatory Administration and
Congressional Republicans did not oppose the legislation.
As insider trading scandals grabbed headlines, some show of government control
was necessary in order to balance the Reagan Administration’s commitment to economic
deregulation.29 When Reagan took office in 1980, many expected that the SEC would
relax securities enforcement. Reagan’s choice to head the SEC, John Shad, famously
declared on taking office that he would come down with “hobnail boots” on insider
traders. Shad’s strong statement may have been specifically intended to blunt criticism of
the Administration’s deregulatory philosophy.30 Shad came to the SEC chairmanship
with directions to deregulate and to reduce enforcement resources. The Reagan
transition team recommended reducing the SEC budget by 30% over three years, and
cutting its Enforcement Division from 200 members to 50.31 The number of SEC staff
remained the same from Shad’s arrival in 1981 until 1984, and rose by only about 1% in
1985 and again in 1986.32
The SEC also came under fire for excessive leniency in insider trading cases just
prior to the passage of ITSA. When Thomas Reed settled civil insider trading charges
with the SEC, the settlement was criticized because it required Reed only to disgorge his
29

The Enron-era scandals put the government in a similar position, leading to calls for regulation from the
most unlikely of sources: “Off and on over the years, a few capitalists have done more to delegitimize
capitalism than America's impotent socialist critics ever did or today's moribund left could hope to. It is the
Republicans' special responsibility to punish such capitalists.” George F. Will, …Especially From
Republicans, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2002, at A19.
30
See Donald Langevoort, The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and Its Effect on Existing Law, 37
VANDERBILT L. REV. 1273, 1275 (1984).
31
See Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation By Enforcement: A Look Ahead At the Next
Decade, 7 YALE J. REG. 149, 201, (1990) (quoting Final Rept. of Transition Team, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) no. 587, at K-1 (Jan 21, 1981)). The transition team also recommended turning the SEC’s Division
of Market Regulation into a “think tank” and eliminating the Washington headquarters of the Enforcement
Division. Id.
32
JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 576 (3d ed. 2003).
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the profits from the disputed transaction. He paid no penalty and neither admitted nor
denied guilt.33 Around the same time, a federal district court criticized the SEC for
seeking similar mild sanctions against an accused insider trader. The judge called the
SEC “derelict in its duty.” “These are thieves we're talking about,” he stated in court.
“The Government is prosecuting people for stealing Social Security checks out of the
mail, welfare frauds, and here these people come down and get a slap on the wrist. That
isn't much in the way of deterrence.”34
2. The Solution: Legislation as Legitimation
Congress responds to economic crises with new legislation because legislating is
what Congress does, not necessarily because new legislation is an appropriate solution.
John Coates has argued that new legislation, regardless of its merits, “allows politicians
to show they can ‘do something,’ while inaction requires politicians to defend a status
quo tainted in the voting public's mind by the salient fact of market downturn or
scandal.”35 Action is especially attractive, according to Coates, when it is difficult for the
public to verify whether legislative action will have a positive effect.
In response to the economic uncertainties of the 1980s, Congress needed to pass
something. The root causes of America’s economic problems were far too deep to be
addressed by piecemeal legislation (and, ironically, the economy was well into recovery
by the mid-1980s). As noted, however, Congress is better suited to address the particular
than the general. Congress nonetheless felt pressure to respond to public anxiety about
33

The Senate held hearings to investigate the SEC’s handling of the Reed case. Senator D’Amato, Chair
of the Banking Committee’s Subcommittee on Securities, concluded that “the SEC staff acted in a wholly
professional manner.” Letter from D’Amato to Rep. Timothy Wirth, April 12, 1983, reprinted in H.R. Ser.
No. 98-33, at 7 (1983).
34
Kenneth B. Noble, Insider Cases And the S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES, January 25, 1983, at D2.
35
John C. Coates IV, The Privatization of Securities Laws: Private vs. Political Choice of Securities
Regulation: A Political Cost/Benefit Analysis, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 531, 568-69 (2001).
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the economy. Providing a solution to a complex problem necessarily involves framing
the nature and scope of the problem. The way in which Congress frames a problem will
inevitably be influenced by political concerns and practical limitations of Congress.
There was little Congress could do about major issues such as global competitiveness and
job security. Such issues are the stuff of industrial policy that America has traditionally
left to market forces.
Congress can enhance the perceived value of its legislative action—and thus its
legitimating effect—by influencing constituents’ preferences. That is, Congress may
reframe a complex, inchoate problem (vague economic uncertainty) as a narrow one it
can address (insider trading), then set out to address it. Thus, members of Congress not
only enjoy autonomy from their constituents’ interests, but also play a hand in shaping
those interests. According to the old cliché, if the only tool you have is a hammer,
everything starts looking like a nail. In focusing on insider trading, however, Congress
didn’t just mistake economic problems for law-enforcement problems, but chose to
reframe economic problems as law-enforcement “nails” that it could more easily solve
with its legislative “hammer.”
Mainstream political science, following mainstream rational choice theory,
assumes that individual preferences are exogenous. Yet a growing body of theoretical
and empirical work suggests that preferences are endogenous.36 Elected representatives
may play a role in shaping constituents’ preferences in addition to simply aggregating
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See Elizabeth Gerber and John Jackson, Endogenous Political Preferences and the Study of Institutions,
87 AM. POLI. SCI. REV. 639 (1993). Gerber and Jackson present empirical evidence suggesting that
partisan voters’ preferences with respect to civil rights reform and the Vietnam War changed along with
shifts in their party’s expressed position on those issues.
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them.37 This type of autonomy is more than an agency cost—it undermines the basic
assumptions of the traditional principal-agent model. The multiplicity of varied and
sometimes conflicting directives from constituents allows—indeed it requires—
politicians to choose from a wide range of policy priorities. That is, in articulating policy
justifications, legislators necessarily engage in some degree of constructing the publicly
accepted justifications, not simply choosing them.38 This is true whether legislators are
consciously controlling the agenda (for selfish or high-minded purposes) or attempting in
good faith to coherently serve the incoherent deluge of constituents’ preferences.39

My

purpose here is to challenge the characterization of Congress as a passive conduit or mere
agent. I do not mean to argue that voters are simply passive victims of false
consciousness.40 Indeed, voters were not necessarily convinced by Congress’s insistence
that insider trading regulation was a fundamental problem. Most likely, legislation
involves a complex combination of politicians acting in self-interest, catering to
constituent preferences, and influencing those preferences.

IV. EVIDENCE FROM THE HEARINGS

37

Cf. id. at 654 (“the role of institutions [e.g., political parties] in developing preferences may be more
important than their role as aggregator of these preferences”).
38
See MAYHEW, supra note --, at 18.
It is understandably fashionable to credit “the media” for setting the agenda of public discourse.
Establishing the extent of this role relative to Washington’s role is beyond the scope of this paper, but some
speculation on the issue is appropriate here. Obviously, media fascination with insider trading in the 1980s
helped make it a prominent issue in the public imagination and thus a salient one for politicians. But there
would have been no “insider trading” to report on without a construct of that name—primarily a legal and
political construct. Most likely, the media and Congress (as well as prosecutors), each having reasons to
play up insider trading, acted symbiotically to construct the perception of an epidemic.
39
This is reminiscent of the debate in corporate governance over whether directors should owe legal duties
to multiple constituents, with the goal of maximizing corporate or social welfare generally, or to
shareholders only, in order to cabin directors’ discretion.
40
Cf MAYHEW, supra note ---, at 19 (“There is nothing undemocratic or otherwise questionable about such
voter plasticity; voters would have to be dense not to consider updating their preferences in response to
relevant moves and events.”)
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1. Constructing the Insider Trading “Epidemic”
Congress ostensibly paid so much attention to insider trading in the 1980s because
an epidemic of insider trading was in progress. Most of the legislators demonstrated an
unwavering conviction that such a problem existed. But while the anecdotal evidence
was plentiful, the committees and subcommittees holding the hearings neither requested
nor received any formal evidence of an insider trading epidemic. Indeed, Congress
pressed on despite the fact that the SEC insisted there was no crisis. Congress largely
ignored other issues that the SEC identified as more pressing, such as accounting
reform—an omission which has certainly came back to haunt us. Congress assumed that
insider trading was a major problem, both in terms of the rate of incidence and the threat
it posed to the economy. Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the insider trading
hearings is the absence of any testimony (other than bare statements of opinion) or other
evidence tending to establish either of these points. Legislators did not receive or even
ask for any hard evidence. Rather, they made repeated, unsubstantiated claims of a rising
incidence of insider trading and the danger it posed to the markets.
It might be argued that it is irrelevant whether an insider trading epidemic was
actually under way, because even a perception of an epidemic could undermine investor
confidence and thus justify Congressional action. Legislators and witnesses claimed that
recent revelations of insider trading had damaged “investor confidence” in 1987 Senate
hearings on “Oversight of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Securities
Industry.” Senator D’Amato claimed that “The public cannot help but think that the dice
are loaded… [because of] the recent scandals….If steps aren’t taken to change this
perception and restore public confidence, the public is going to exit from the market and

18

LEGISLATION AND LEGITIMATION
not come back.”41 Similarly, Donald Marron, Chair & CEO of Paine Webber, argued
that “Insider trading abuses undermine confidence in our markets and could potentially
drive foreign investors away.”42 Senator Proxmire was in full agreement with Marron but
asked for examples or proof. Marron did not attempt to do so, but merely repeated his
assertions.
The hearings generated no evidence that insider trading was harming investor
confidence, however. A 1986 poll showed 69% of adults believed that insider trading is
common. The percentage was even higher—76%—among adults who invest in the
markets.43 Despite this perception, the markets were setting records by the middle of the
decade. D’Amato himself observed in the 1987 hearing that the stock market was
“reaching new highs almost daily” and that volatility was being caused by “program
trading,” not loss of confidence.44 Senator Hecht noted, “We have the highest volume in
history and so obviously people still have respect for [the securities] industry.”45 The
strength of the markets in the 1980s contradicts the theory that a perception of
widespread insider trading was discouraging investment.46 Voters did not seem to think
insider trading was a major issue in the mid-1980s. In November 1986, after most of the
major insider trading scandals of the 1980s had come to light, one survey found only 66%
of respondents surveyed thought insider trading should be illegal. Seventy-eight percent
41

Oversight of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Securities Industry: Before the Subcomm.
on Securities of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st sess. 5 (1987)
(hereinafter S. Hrg. 100-83). See also Insider Trading: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Telecommunications and Finance of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d sess. 18
(1988) (hereinafter H.R. Ser. No.100-225)(remarks by Representative Rinaldo); Improper Activities in the
Securities Industry: Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st sess. 4,
7 (1987) (hereinafter S.Hrg. 100-76) (remarks by Senators Shelby and Riegle).
42
S. Hrg. 100-83 at 13 (1987).
43
Representative Rinaldo cited this poll in a 1986 hearing. H.R. Ser. No. 99-168, at 2 (1986).
44
S. Hrg 100-83 at .
45
S. Hrg. 100-83 at 7.
46
Indeed, the belief that there were many successful, undiscovered insider traders may have encouraged
investment by bolstering the perception that an investor can “beat the market” by amassing information.
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of respondents thought most people would trade on an inside tip, and over half said they
would trade on a tip.47
The point here is not to determine empirically whether insider trading justified
Congressional attention. Given the difficulty of measuring the incidence of insider
trading, so we may never know the answer. This uncertainty underscores the dual role of
government in the construction, as well as the fulfillment, of political preferences. When
the federal government began paying increased attention to insider trading cases, there
was no doubt some real illegal activity taking place as well as some real public sentiment
against it. But the choice to focus on that particular activity was not merely a response to
illegality or public sentiment. Prosecutors enjoy a great deal of discretion in choosing
what cases to bring.48 Congress too has a great deal of “legislative discretion” akin to
prosecutorial discretion. On one level Congress was reacting to a crisis, real or imagined,
partly constructed by prosecutors. On another level Congress was actively attempting to
construct the “insider trading crisis” as a political symbol.
The insider trading hearings support Davidson and Oleszek’s contention that
Congressional hearings are only nominally geared toward fact finding, and are in fact
venues for politically-minded performances.49 Legislators seemed more concerned with
decrying for the record the “problem” of insider trading than with obtaining any
information about it. Their pronouncements about the extent and importance of the

47

See Pitt & Shapiro, supra note --, at 26 n.325.
Rudolph Giuliani, as U.S. Attorney in New York City, brought most of the famous insider trading
prosecutions of the mid 1980s. Fischel argues that Giuliani constructed an insider trading crisis in order to
advance his political career. See DANIEL R. FISCHEL, PAYBACK (1995). As Fischel notes, many of the
convictions in those cases were later overturned.
49
See DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, quoted supra.
48
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problem are largely confined to their opening statements.50 To the extent that witnesses
discussed the matter at all, they tended to dispute the idea of an insider trading epidemic.
Such testimony does not necessarily disprove the existence of an epidemic. But the
absence of serious testimony tending to show a widespread problem supports the thesis
that the hearings did not serve serious fact-finding purposes. Indeed, the failure to
request any such testimony suggests the hearings were not even intended to serve such
purposes. Politicians had made up their minds to attack the “problem” before the
hearings and used the hearings to justify that decision.51
Shad was a featured witness at most of the insider trading hearings, but he
disputed the extent of the alleged insider trading problem. While Shad portrayed himself
to the public as an enforcer (for example, with his “hobnail boots” declaration), he urged
moderation to Congress in the hearings.52 Throughout the ITSA and ITSFEA hearings,
members of Congress repeatedly invited Shad to join them in declaring an insider trading
epidemic. Shad consistently refused to do so. He may have been motivated in part by a
desire to protect the markets from additional government regulation. Or he may have

50

For example, Subcommittee Chair Markey opened the final House Hearings on ITSFEA by stating “The
war against insider trading must be fought on many fronts.” He also declared that, “During a time when
Wall Street has been set aflame with fraudulent activity, those of us in public office will not be seen as
fiddling.” H.R. Ser. No. 100-225, at 2.
51
Congress did not place emphasis on fact-finding outside of the hearing context, either. As mentioned
above, ITSFEA contained a provision directing the SEC to conduct a study of the securities markets. The
SEC had presented its last comprehensive study in 1963. The SEC never conducted the new study,
however, because ITSFEA had made the study contingent on a subsequent Congressional appropriation of
$5 million, which never occurred. Stuart Kaswell, Republican counsel to the House Energy and Commerce
Committee during the drafting of ITSFEA, states that the Committee did not want the cost of the study to
cut into SEC enforcement resources. Kaswell, supra note --, at 179. But the contingent nature of the
provision also suggests that Congress was not very concerned with whether the study actually took place,
or at least that it was more interested in enforcement than in determining whether enforcement was
necessary. Kaswell, writing a very favorable assessment of ITSFEA shortly after its enactment, was least
sanguine about the study provision, expressing skepticism that Congress would ever appropriate the
funding “in an era of federal deficit reduction.” Id. at 179.
52
See next paragraph and the discussion of penalties and enforcement, infra.
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been trying to understate the corruption in the market in order to reassure investors.53 He
may also have been motivated in part by loyalty to the budget cuts of the early Reagan
years: until December 1986, Shad did not seek increased funding for enforcement, even
when the Senate encouraged him to do so.54
Shad did not view enforcement or investor protection as the main goals of the
SEC. In the same press conference as the “hobnail boots” comment, he stated that his
priority upon taking charge of the SEC would be “improving the capital formation
process.”55 Reflecting on his most important achievements upon leaving office in 1987,
Shad reiterated this theme. He did not even mention enforcement or insider trading.
Instead, he called integrated disclosure and shelf registration “two of the most important
improvements in the securities laws since they were enacted in 1933 and 1934.” These
developments, he argued, “are saving companies, for the benefit of their shareholders,
well over a billion dollars a year.”56
Although the SEC had drafted the bill that eventually became ITSA, Shad was
cool and matter of fact in his testimony.57 He answered questions tersely when asked,
declining to join the legislators who fulminated at length about the evil of insider trading.
Shad did not even advocate for the bill which his own agency had advanced. Indeed, he
seemed to suggest that private-sector resistance to ITSA was more well-considered than
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Donald Langevoort has argued that while the SEC must point out flaws in the market in order to justify
its existence, it must at the same time reassure investors in order to keep market participation robust and its
own regulatory domain large and important. Langevoort, supra note --.
54
See infra Part IV.4. (“Enforcement Resources”).
55
Kenneth A. Noble, SEC Chief Plans Insider Trade Curb, N.Y. TIMES, October 26, 1981 at D1.
56
Nathaniel C. Nash, Shad’s View of 6 Busy Years, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1987 at D1.
57
Shad’s restrained position contrast with the legislative proposal the SEC sent to the House in 1982. The
proposal identified insider trading as a “serious problem” that “undermines expectations of fairness,” and
argued that “[t]ougher sanctions are needed.” H. REP. 98-355, 98th Cong. 2d sess., at 23, 21 (1983)
reprinted in 1984 USCCAN 2274, 2295, 2293. A cover letter accompanying the proposal, signed by Shad,
stated that the proposal represented the views of the Commission.
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the SEC’s own bill. He said ITSA was drafted by the SEC “staff” and that while the
Commission approved it, “we did not have a Commission discussion in the kind of detail
that has been raised by very responsible members of the bar and the securities dealers.”58
During the House hearings on ITSA in 1984, members of Congress tried
unsuccessfully to get Shad to decry insider trading and its corrosive effect on investor
confidence. Representative John Dingell (D-Mich.), Chair of the House Committee on
Energy and Commerce, asked Shad whether there might be more insider trading activity
than the SEC was able to detect. Shad acknowledged that to be possible, but added with
implacable logic that for any type of securities law violation, indeed for any type of legal
violation, “we do not know the cases that we do not identify.” Dingell pressed on, asking
whether those undetected cases might affect investors’ returns and undermine “the
overall confidence of the trading public in the marketplace.” Again, Shad declined to
sound the alarm, replying that securities law violations were unlikely to affect the market
if they were unknown to investors.59 Finally, Dingell sought Shad’s affirmation of the
following, more restrained assessment: “There are certainly some rogues out there taking
unfair advantages and behaving…like thieves.”60 Shad agreed at last, but immediately
qualified Dingell’s mild statement even further: “I would like to put it in perspective…I
believe that it is a very tiny fraction of the billion of dollars in securities that change
hands daily.”61
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H.R. Ser. No. 98-33 at 53.
H.R. Ser. No. 98-33 at 65.
60
Id.
61
Id. Testifying before the Senate on ITSA, Shad’s chief of enforcement, John Fedders, agreed that insider
trading should not be overemphasized: “The goal right now for the enforcement program is not to target it
in one area. Insider trading gets enormous publicity because people can understand it and even people in
the press can understand it and they can write about it.” The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1983 [sic]:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d sess. 66 (1984) (hereinafter S. Hrg. 98-831).
59
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Even as the testimony raised doubts about the insider trading epidemic, it
identified other issues as more important—issues that went unaddressed. James
Treadway, then an SEC Commissioner, had recently identified accounting fraud as a
greater threat to the markets than insider trading. John Fedders, the SEC’s chief of
enforcement, agreed with Treadway, and said,
Insider trading has been ballyhooed by the press and made larger than life…Last
year it consumed only 8 percent of 250-plus cases that we brought—only 20
cases….there is no way you can compare insider trading as a priority to two other
areas, that being cooked books…and second, our enforcement program against
regulated entities, broker dealers, [and] brokerage firms. Insider trading or any
other priority that comes about will never replace those two as number one and
number two because that is the business we are in.62
Despite the opinions of Treadway and Fedders, Congress did not move to address the
issues of accounting fraud and broker-dealer regulation.63 What explains the success of
arguably unimportant legislation increasing insider trading penalties, and the failure of
the arguably more important issue of accounting reform—a failure that came back to
haunt us in the Enron-WorldCom era? Recall the simple argument that Congress feels
pressure to produce results—i.e., legislation—to justify its legitimacy in times of
economic uncertainty. Congress may have chosen to address insider trading in part
because it is relatively easy to produce results in the form of increased penalties. It may
have paid less attention to accounting reform because focusing on that complex issue, and
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H.R. Ser. No. 98-33 at 86 (1983).
The House convened hearings on accounting failures in 1985, apparently inspired by the early thrift
failures that eventually snowballed into the savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s. Interestingly enough,
however, the hearings focused on accounting in public corporations, not thrifts. Rep. Ron Wyden proposed
an accounting reform bill in 1986. After it failed, he introduced a series of progressively more watereddown versions in subsequent years. These proposals yielded nothing until a small provision regarding
auditor reporting of fraud was included in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Section 10A, 15 U.S.C. 78j-1. See Thomas L. Riesenberg, Trying to Hear the
Whistle Blowing: The Widely Misunderstood “Illegal Act” Reporting Requirements of Exchange Act
Section 10A, 56 BUS. LAW. 1417 (2001); Quinton F. Seamons, Audit Standards and Detection of Fraud
under the Private Securities Litigation Act of 1995, 24 SEC. REG. L. J. 259, 260-67 (1996).
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taking on its powerful, entrenched opponents in the accounting profession, was less likely
to bear fruit.
Two years after the passage of ITSA, Congress again held hearings on insider
trading. The 1986 hearings were apparently motivated by recent revelations of insider
trading by investment banker Dennis Levine and by the so-called “Yuppie Five.” The
Congressmen praised Shad effusively for his purportedly aggressive fight against insider
trading.64 But Shad again downplayed the scope of the insider trading problem. “There
is too much insider trading,” he conceded, “but it should not be exaggerated out of
proportion.”65 He argued that

all fraudulent securities activities, including insider trading, amount to a
fraction of 1 percent of the multibillions of dollars of corporate and
Government securities that trade daily in America.
It should also be noted that insider trading is but one component of
the Commission’s enforcement program.66
Asked whether he thought the incidence of insider trading had increased, Shad would
offer only that, “I think the dollar amount is much greater than it’s been, because the
dollar amount of everything else that’s going on in the market is so much higher than it’s
ever been before.”67 According to Shad, the public had an inflated picture of the
incidence of insider trading because “[w]hat many think is insider trading is more often
than not legal speculation on rumors and gossip.”68
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H.R. Ser. No. 99-168 at 1 (Wirth), 2 (Rinaldo), 3 (Luken).
Id. at 12.
66
Id. at 5.
67
Id. at 39. See also id. at 44: “We are now in the strongest bull market in history. So the whole
marketplace has expanded enormously and there is no evidence that this activity has expanded more than
the rest of the market.” Shad further states that the increase in tender offers has “given greater visibility,
greater opportunity for abuse.” Id. at 44.
68
Id. See also id at 5. As Shad’s comment indicates, the disagreement between legislators and witnesses
over the prevalence of “insider trading” may be partly due to the lack of an agreed-upon definition of the
65
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The witnesses’ testimony did not support the legislators’ belief that insider trading
was increasing. Gordon Macklin, president of NASD, stated merely that insider trading
“undermines the reasonable expectation that all participants in the securities markets play
by the same rules.” He said no more about the extent of the problem. John Phelan, head
of the New York Stock Exchange, went on at length about the corrosive effect of insider
trading on investor confidence. But he did not argue that insider trading was on the rise.
Rather, his testimony focused on describing and defending the NYSE’s internal detection
programs. Although he conceded that these measures “may not be a final answer,” he
argued that, along with ITSA, they “constitute a strong deterrent.”69 Arthur Levitt, then
the Chairman and CEO of the American Stock Exchange, also refused to join the dire
chorus about insider trading. Levitt acknowledged evidence of price movement prior to
public announcements of takeovers, but argued that it could be caused by legal purchases
by acquirers, as well as by professional investors who had deduced the likelihood of
takeovers.70 Thus “one cannot conclude that this activity evidences an epidemic of
insider trading.”71
Later in 1986, additional hearings were held just after the settlement of the Ivan
Boesky case. Representative Ronald Wyden (D-Ore.) asked John Phelan whether
Boesky’s insider trading was just “the tip of the iceberg” or an “aberration.”72 Phelan
said he was unable to answer that; Wyden insisted on a response, but Phelan continued to
demur. Finally, Phelan allowed that, “based on my 30 years of gut feeling… there has

term. Although defining the term would seem a prerequisite to any discussion of insider trading, Congress
failed to do so. See section IV.4., infra.
69
Id. at 149.
70
Id. at 182.
71
Id.
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SEC and Insider Trading: Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d sess. 158 (1986) (hereinafter H.R. Ser. No. 99-179).
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got to be more in that area than is out now, and maybe significantly more.” Wyden
thanked the witness for finally conceding to Wyden’s predetermined conclusion. “Your
30 years of gut feeling are certainly helpful and confirms [sic] what I have heard at this
point.” But no witness up to that point had argued that insider trading was on the rise.
Stephen Hammerman, general counsel for Merrill Lynch, testified that he did not believe
insider trading was widespread proportionate to the size of the industry, or that it was
growing. In both hearings, the testimony of the exchanges and securities firms
downplaying the significance of insider trading obviously had a self-serving element.
The point, however, is that Congress concluded that insider trading was a significant and
growing problem even though the hearings adduced no meaningful evidence to that
effect. Wyden’s exchange with Phelan epitomizes the fact that legislators had made up
their minds about the scourge of insider trading and would not let any hearing testimony
affect their views.
In 1987 hearings on insider trading, Senator Donald Riegle (D-Mich) stated that
the confirmation of David Ruder as Shad’s successor would hinge upon whether Ruder
would be as committed as Shad to battling “the contagion of insider trading.”73 Riegle’s
position is typical of the depiction of insider trading as a fundamental economic issue.
But Riegle’s suggestion that Shad is a model crusader against insider trading is odd.
Over and over again in the hearings, Shad refused to join Congress in its claims of an
insider trading crisis, and he was lukewarm at best with respect to legislative proposals.
Yet legislators granted him a great deal of deference and even praise. Riegle expressed
hope that Ruder would “measure up” to Shad with respect to insider trading, and he
73

Definition of Insider Trading: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Securities of the S. Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, Part 1, 100th Cong., 1st sess. 2 (1987) (hereinafter S. Hrg. 100-155 pt.1)
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seems to have gotten his wish: in hearings on ITSFEA, Ruder was as lukewarm as Shad
had been. And as with Shad, legislators did not attempt to cast Ruder as the villain,
despite his opposition to much of the bill.

When asked directly if he supported the bill,

Ruder replied, “Not all of it.” The questioner, Representative Howard Nielson (R
- Utah),
then asked if the bill was “salvageable,” to which Ruder unenthusiastically gave a
somewhat affirmative response. In Wyden-like fashion, Nielson thanked Ruder and
declared himself “encouraged” by this answer.74
In April 1987, the Senate held a hearing entitled “Improper Activities in the
Securities Industry.” The only witnesses were Gary Lynch, the SEC’s chief of
enforcement, and Rudolph Giuliani, U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New
York. The hearing consisted largely of discussion of their recent investigation and
prosecution of Dennis Levine and Ivan Boesky, two of the most notorious insider traders
of the 1980s. Senator William Proxmire (D-Wisc.), chair of the Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, lauded Lynch and Giuliani as “the Ferdinand Pecoras of the
1980’s.”75 The comparison is far-fetched to say the least. Unlike the Pecora hearings,
which purported to uncover deep patterns of corruption on Wall Street, the insider trading
prosecutions led only to the punishment of individuals. Proxmire’s reference to the
Pecora hearings underscores the fact that none of the 1980s insider trading hearings
involved documents, investigations, or testimony revealing corrupt practices in the
securities industry, as the Pecora hearings had.76 Pecora investigated and exposed large,
established companies and banks as corrupt organizations, while Lynch and Giuliani
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H.R. Ser. No. 100-225, at 94 (1988).
Improper Activities in the Securities Industry: Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 100th Cong. 2 (1987).
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See SELIGMAN, supra note 32, at 20-38 (describing Pecora Hearings).
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prosecuted individual criminals (including proof readers, clerks, word processors, and the
like).77 Rather than conducting investigation and fact-finding, the hearings start from the
presumption that insider trading is a major problem and ask witnesses to agree with that
opinion and to speculate about its frequency and economic effects. The hearings on
“Improper Activities in the Securities Industry” congratulate Lynch and Giuliani for their
completed cases and listen to condemnations of Levine and Boesky issued by members
of the financial establishment with no direct knowledge of the conduct.78
Proxmire framed the purpose of the hearings as follows:
Some have argued that we should drop all laws that prohibit insider
trading…They would argue that…the Boeskies and the Levines…deserve every
penny they can steal. So you [Lynch and Giuliani] tell us, if you get a chance,
why we, as Members of the Congress, should be concerned with insider
trading…and does insider trading, in fact, demean and damage the capital markets
of our country.79
Proxmire’s suggestion that there was significant opposition to the prohibition on insider
trading is simply false.80 A few academics questioned the prohibition of insider trading,81
but none of them testified at any of the hearings or enjoyed a prominent place in the
public debate at the time. No politicians or regulators had suggested any rollback of
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insider trading law.82 As for Proxmire’s question of whether insider trading affects the
capital markets, this is an empirical issue as to which two law-enforcement officials
basking in praise for successful insider trading prosecutions are hardly the most qualified
or impartial sources.

2. Hostile Takeovers
Why would Congress participate in creating the impression of an insider trading
epidemic, rather than accepting the SEC’s denials? America’s multiple, inchoate
economic uncertainties could not be denied. Congress needed a relatively simple and
manageable problem to serve as a proxy for those anxieties and an opportunity for
Congress to respond to them. Hostile takeovers were perhaps the most potent symbol of
the economic woes of the 1980s. They were, rightly or wrongly, popularly blamed for
mass layoffs and the loss of American competitiveness. But they were far more complex
and politically difficult to address than insider trading. Furthermore, although hostile
takeover activity was a major point of populist concern, the Reagan Administration
supported it the name of free markets and the expected efficiency gains of a “market for
corporate control.” In the face of Republican opposition, Democrats’ attempts to regulate
hostile takeovers failed. Insider trading, however, had no defenders. In the insider
trading hearings, members of Congress (mainly Democrats) repeatedly overstated and
distorted the connection between insider trading and hostile takeovers. In so doing they
may have been attempting to portray insider trading legislation as a substitute for hostile
takeover regulation, which they were unable to pass into law.
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though he called it “far-fetched.” S. Hrg. 100-83, (1987).
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An obvious irony of politics is that it is easier to reach agreement when less is at
stake. A focused campaign against an easy target, insider trading, provided an
opportunity for both parties to express concern about economic issues and to show its
effectiveness by producing a legislative response. Insider trading regulation was probably
more palatable to Republicans than hostile takeover regulation because it did not threaten
arguably productive business practices. On the other hand, Democrats portrayed it as a
substitute for their failure to pass hostile takeover regulation. In the hearings, Democratic
members of Congress repeatedly conflate insider trading with hostile takeovers. They
appear to have been suggesting to constituents that insider trading laws would impede
hostile takeovers despite the failure of attempts to pass actual takeover regulation.
In the 1980s, there was a great deal of public anxiety about hostile takeovers.
Hostile takeovers were upsetting to labor, the economic establishment, and members of
the public who envied wealth.83 Hostile takeovers were, rightly or wrongly, identified
with mass layoffs, and thus came to symbolize the economic uncertainty of the 1980s.84
Although major economic indicators suggest that the recession had ended by the mid1980s, hostile takeovers remained a major political concern throughout the decade.85
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Insider trading and takeovers were linked in the public imagination. Business
Week’s cover story of April 29, 1985, was titled Insider Trading: The Wall Street
Epidemic Washington Can’t Stop. Business Week conducted a study of 229 takeover
attempts and found that in 72 percent of the cases, target company prices rose before a
bid was publicly announced. Prominent insider traders, such as Dennis Levine, Ivan
Boesky, and the “Yuppie Five,” were convicted for trading on nonpublic information
regarding hostile acquisitions.86
The hostile takeover wave of the 1980s has been criticized for destroying
American businesses and jobs, and defended as part of a salutary streamlining of bloated
American industry. This article takes no position on this issue. Justified or not, there
was strong anti-takeover sentiment in the popular imagination, from organized labor,87
and from the financial and industrial establishment.88 The Reagan White House and the
SEC, however, were “ideologically committed to fostering a market for corporate
control.”89 Democrats in Congress tried, and failed, to pass legislation restricting hostile
takeovers. In the insider trading hearings, politicians consistently conflated takeovers
and insider trading in an apparent attempt to suggest that, by passing laws punishing
insider trading, they were striking a blow against hostile takeovers.
Hostile acquirers and many academic commentators justified the hostile takeover
movement in large part with the argument that it would unlock shareholder value. This
86
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approach explicitly placed stock prices ahead of employee welfare and other measures of
a corporation’s social utility. Both the normative argument that privileged shareholder
value and the descriptive argument that hostile takeovers served that norm were
extremely controversial at the time. The public and many politicians in the 1980s tended
to dismiss the focus on share price as an immoral or disingenuous justification for the
greed of “corporate raiders.” Even John Shad voiced this same skepticism in a June 1984
speech calling for takeover regulation. Treasury Secretary Donald Regan, however, soon
stated the White House’s opposition to regulation and argued for the beneficial economic
functions of takeovers. Shad did not revisit the issue.
Both parties felt political pressure to respond to hostile takeovers. The Tender
Offer Report Act was introduced in the House in 1984. Senator Proxmire introduced the
Corporate Productivity Act in 1985, requiring that all takeover attempts be done by
tender offers submitted to the target’s board of directors. Multiple takeover regulation
bills were introduced in the Senate in 1987. Rather than adopting Secretary Regan’s
strong pro-takeover position, Congressional Republicans introduced their own version of
tender-offer reform.90 The GOP bill also included some measures designed to fight
insider trading.91 Neither the securities industry nor the SEC supported either party’s
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H.R. 2668, 100th Cong., 1st sess., 3 Cong. Rec. H4558 (1987). Of course, the introduction of a
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proposals, and the parties could not come to agreement on a compromise bill.92 None of
the proposed takeover regulation bills passed.93
Although the parties could not agree on hostile takeover legislation, they could
agree that insider trading was undesirable. Furthermore, tender offer reform lacked the
support of the SEC and the White House. Accordingly, the Administration had
apparently chosen to respond to the excesses of the hostile takeover market indirectly
through insider-trading prosecutions of prominent takeover artists like Milken and
Boesky rather than through tender offer regulation.94 Thus insider-trading laws,
particularly ITSFEA in 1988, may have been in part a compromise attempt between
Democrats and Republicans to suggest that they were taking some economic action in
response to hostile takeovers. This tail came to wag the dog: after the failure of antitakeover legislation in 1987, Congress passed ITSFEA, insider trading legislation more
extensive than that included in the GOP’s anti- takeover bill.
In the 1980s hearings, many Democrats insisted that insider trading and takeovers
were “related,” but they never established precisely what that relationship was. The
conflation raises questions about the extent to which insider trading was the true concern
of Congress. The evidence suggests that the insider trading hearings and legislation were
at least in part an expression of displaced anti-takeover sentiment. Indeed, the Senators
who conflated hostile takeovers with insider trading in hearings on insider trading barely
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mentioned insider trading in the hearings on anti-takeover bills in 1987.95 Instead, they
focused on the arguments that hostile takeovers destroy healthy companies and cost jobs.
As with the question of the insider trading “epidemic,” Congress did not seek
evidence of a link between hostile takeovers and insider trading. And, as with the
“epidemic” question, Congress ignored the conflicting views of John Shad. In 1983
hearings on ITSA, Shad did not criticize hostile takeovers or directly blame them for
insider trading. He did note, however, that hostile takeovers provide especially profitable
opportunities for insider trading,96 especially with the growth of standardized option
contracts.97 After Treasury Secretary Regan expressed the White House’s support for an
active corporate control market, Shad told the Senate in 1985 that takeovers were good
for the economy because they tended to increase market capitalization.98 He also
expressed faith in the market to judge the value of junk bonds, which were often used to
finance takeovers and thus considered part of the perceived takeover problem.
Although prices often spike prior to takeover announcements, Shad argued that
these price increases are “often” the result of legal purchases by prospective acquirers
themselves and other parties with legally acquired information.99 According to Shad,
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it is not difficult for securities analysts, risk arbitrageurs, speculators and a
wide variety of others to identify probable takeover candidates….If you
wanted my opinion, I believe that the legitimate reasons, plus rumors and
speculations that the market has always had in enormous quantity, far
exceed the amount of insider trading prior to public announcement.100

The House held hearings on insider trading in December 1986. The Levine case
had settled that spring, and the Boesky case had just settled. In the meantime, the SEC
and Justice Department continued to investigate Michael Milken, who had close
professional ties to Boesky and whose junk-bond empire dominated the financing of
hostile takeovers. These individuals, like so many of the prominent insider traders of the
1980s, were convicted or suspected of trading on information about takeovers. Thus they
intensified the popular association of insider trading with hostile takeovers.
Representative Michael Oxley (R-Ohio) was clearly in the minority when he argued in
vain that “these are two distinct issues. I trust we will reserve our other hearings to
examine the tender offer problem.”101 Instead, the insider trading hearings became a
forum for criticizing hostile takeovers.
As Shad pointed out, the hostile takeover wave created unprecedented
opportunities to make immense profits by trading on nonpublic information. But many
members of Congress reversed the relationship, suggesting that insider trading causes
takeovers. Representative Wyden asked, “Would the whole phenomenon of what Mr.
Boesky so poetically calls ‘merger mania’ have gathered steam without widespread use
of insider trading? It seems very, very unlikely.”102 Similarly, Representative Florio (D-
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N.J.) stated, “The insider trading scandal has…raised some significant questions
about…what in fact is the driving force behind [hostile] takeovers.” 103 This reverse
theory—that insider trading is indispensable to takeovers—makes little sense. Indeed,
trading on leaked information about a planned takeover bid can trigger an increase in the
target’s price, thus discouraging the acquisition.104
In 1986 hearings on SEC funding, Representative Dingell asked Shad to tell the
panel:
what will be the level of enforcement that you will need to properly deal
with not only the insider trading questions, but the other related questions
of takeovers and mergers…because it appears very much to the Chair that
these are related matters and may perhaps be simply different portions of
the same apple.105
By implying that takeovers could be regulated by stepping up securities law enforcement,
this statement diverted attention from Congress’s failure to pass anti-takeover legislation.
Furthermore, it shifted responsibility from Congress to the SEC. Moreover, Dingell
referred to hostile takeovers as “related” to insider trading, thus suggesting that
Congressional success in producing insider trading legislation constituted a blow against
insider trading. Dingell did not, however, explain how takeovers and insider trading were
“related.”
The Senate’s 1987 hearings on “Improper Activities in the Securities Industry”
were focused on the recent stock-fraud convictions of Ivan Boesky and Dennis Levine by
Giuliani and Lynch. Nonetheless, senators introduced the hearings bydiscussing hostile
103
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takeovers, characterizing them as an example of “improper activities.” Furthermore,
they implied the reverse theory of causation espoused by Wyden and Florio in the 1986
House hearings. Senator Proxmire asked rhetorically,
How much do we really know about the corporate takeover game and the
complex network of information that circulates among investment bankers,
takeover lawyers, corporate raiders, arbitrageurs, stock brokers, junk bond
investors and public relations specialists? Is insider trading central to the takeover
process, or is it merely an isolated abuse?106
Senator Jim Sasser (D-Tenn.) suggested that takeover bids were announced in order to
create the “opportunity” for insider trading.107 Senator Heinz (R
- Pa.) stated, “I am most
interested in what our witnesses have to say, because what this committee needs to do is
determine whether there is something inherently corrupting in the merger game and the
way it is played.”108 The only witnesses at the hearing, however, were Giuliani and
Lynch, enforcement officials unlikely to be qualified to evaluate “the merger game” as a
whole.
Heinz indicated that his real concern was takeovers per se, not their relationship
to insider trading:
…the fast bucks are being made at the expense, I fear, of America’s
competitiveness, because every fast buck used in a takeover battle, ending up as
debt on a balance sheet of an acquirer, is a buck that cannot go into research or
development or long-term planning or productivity enhancement.109
This is a plausible hypothesis about takeovers, and potentially a good policy justification
for their regulation. But of course, it has nothing to do with insider trading, or the
hearings at hand. The hearings did not discuss whether the takeover wave had resulted in
a misallocation of resources, or whether insider trading had anything to do with it. As
106
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with the general nature of “the merger game,” the macroeconomic consequences of
takeovers were far beyond the expertise of Giuliani and Lynch.
The Senators’ phrasing and their subsequent statements in the hearing show that
they sought testimony not for information, but for confirmation of their preexisting
positions. Indeed, despite the senators’ opening statements, very little of the questioning
concerned the relationship between takeovers and insider trading—about 3 pages of 80
total pages of testimony and questioning.110 This limited discussion addressed only the
uncontroversial fact that impending takeovers (not just hostile ones) create the
opportunity to make unusually large amounts of money from inside information. It did
not explore the implausible theory that insider trading causes hostile takeovers. Indeed,
despite the repeated, unsupported statements of representatives and senators, none of the
hearings include any evidence supporting this idea.
The Senate held hearings in February 1987 on “Oversight of the Securities and
Exchange Commission and the Securities Industry.” Although the hearings were about
the SEC generally and not insider trading in particular, insider trading and hostile
takeovers predictably emerged as a prominent topic. Senator Sasser called for
“legislation that shines the light on the stock manipulations that are at the heart of
corporate takeovers today.”111 Donald Marron, Chair & CEO of Paine Webber Group,
testified that government action was necessary to prevent “the loss of public confidence”
caused by insider trading.112 He supported increasing the flow of information to the
market, for example, by requiring earlier disclosure of the acquisition of large blocks of a
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stock113 and of trades in a stock by the issuing corporation’s directors, officers and major
shareholders.114 In supporting enhanced disclosure, Marron seemed , unsurprisingly,
more concerned with impeding takeovers, not with limiting insider trading based on
takeover information. This is particularly evident in the following statement:
Attempts should be made to achieve more balanced rules between target
companies and buyers to help reduce the abuses that are being experienced
in [tender offers]. For example, more diligent consideration should be
given to the elimination of so-called greenmail and to the creation of rules
that would require the full financing of tender offers before they
happen.115
The “full financing” proposal has no apparent connection to insider trading. Rather, it
appears to be aimed at Michael Milken’s aggressive method of financing takeovers by
relatively small acquirers. Commercial and investment banks were loath to finance
hostile takeovers. Drexel, however, would give unfunded tender offers credibility by
publicly stating that it was “highly confident” it could raise the funding, then quickly do
so by selling junk bonds.116 Marron’s testimony seems to express the financial
establishment’s desire to protect its clients in the corporate establishment from hostile
takeovers.
Congress considered, but ultimately rejected, a direct and potentially effective
method of combating trading based on nonpublic information about takeovers: 13(d)
reform. Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act gives the acquirer of 5 percent or more of a
stock 10 days to file notice of that fact with the issuer, the exchanges, and the SEC. The
113
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opportunity to trade on significant nonpublic information arises during that 10-day
“window.” Requiring earlier disclosure of large positions would limitsuch opportunities,
while avoiding the legislative difficulties involved in creating a new class of proscribed
conduct.117
Since the SEC supported 13(d) reform, it could likely have been passed had it
been proposed by itself or linked to ITSFEA. But it appears that Congress pursued 13(d)
reform as a device for regulating takeovers, not for preventing insider trading. Closing
the 10-day window could derail takeovers because early disclosure would raise
acquisition prices and encourage the issuer to institute takeover defenses. 13(d) reform
came before Congress as part of a package of hostile takeover regulation, and when
hostile takeover regulation failed, 13(d) reform failed with it. This framing of 13(d)
reform is consistent with the argument advanced above thatCongress was more
concerned with takeovers than with insider trading in connection with takeovers.
Indeed, it was well within Congress’s power to directly prohibit trading on
material information about hostile takeovers, yet it declined to do so. The SEC passed
such a rule, Rule 14e-3, in 1980. However, the Commission’s statutory authority to pass
such a rule was, and remains, unclear.118 Nonetheless, Congress did not (and still has
not) acted to codify the prohibition. This further supports the theory that Congress was
more concerned about hostile takeovers per se than insider trading on hostile takeover
information. Conversely, the SEC, which openly favored an active takeover market, was
117
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more interested in regulating misconduct in connection with takeovers than in restricting
takeovers per se.
In 1980, SEC Chair Harold Williams proposed closing the 13(d) window,
apparently to discourage hostile takeovers.119 In 1983, his successor, John Shad,
appointed an Advisory Committee on Tender Offers. The committee stated that it could
not be determined whether hostile takeovers were beneficial or harmful to the economy,
and recommended a mild reform package that included closing the 13(d) window.120 The
proposed Tender Offer Report Act, reported by the House Energy and Commerce
Committee in 1984, would have closed the window, but would have also placed further
requirements on bidders. For example, the bill would have increased the length of time
tender offers were required to remain open, and bidders would have to file an impact
statement. The Reagan administration and the SEC saw the bill as too restrictive and
opposed it. Hearings on takeover regulation were held in the 99th and 100th Congresses,
but they produced no legislation.
The SEC continued to support 13(d) reform in 1987, when Congress once again
considered takeover regulation.121 But as in 1984, 13(d) reform was coupled with
additional takeover restrictions that alienated the SEC and the White House and doomed
the entire package. The takeover bills considered by Congress in 1987 would have, in
slightly different ways, closed or narrowed the 13(d) window, increased required
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disclosure re tender offers, and increased the minimum period of time tender offers were
required to remain open from 20 days to periods ranging from 30 to 60 days.122

3. Moralism, Envy and “New Money”
The choice of insider trading as a symbol translated economic issues into a moral
conflict in which the government clearly held the high ground. With its crusade against
insider trading, Congress expressed moral disapproval of certain business figures without
raising questions about capitalism itself or the government’s interdependent relationship
with it. It was no accident that Congress presented wealthy and powerful individuals as
the “bad guys” in insider trading. Many scholars have argued that financial regulation,
and insider trading regulation in particular, are at least partly motivated by populist
resentment of the wealthy.123 Most of these commentators view Congress as responding
(if not pandering) to constituents’ own prejudices. But the need to criticize the excesses
of capitalism means politicians also have a self-interested motivation to “blame the rich.”
Mark Roe has argued that the development of the U.S. financial regulatory regime
has been heavily influenced by a culturally embedded suspicion of concentrated
economic power. 124 This hostility wanes in good economic times, but resurfaces in
recessions and depressions. According to Roe, the corporate and financial establishment
of the 1930s accepted disclosure regulation as the “lesser of the political evils” at a time
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when many people were clamoring for direct government regulation of business and
socialism was a real political force.
Daniel Fischel has argued that the popular view of the 1980s as the “decade of
greed” is an expression of populist envy of the rich. Further, he has vociferously argued
that that envy fueled the high- profile prosecutions of Michael Milken and Ivan Boesky.125
According to Fischel, hostility toward business and finance arises not only from bad
economic times for average people, but also from extremely prosperous times for the
rich. Despite the “trickle-down” rhetoric of the 1980s and the eventual economic
recovery, the majority of the public was excluded from the great wealth of the stock
market boom. Junk bonds, LBOs, and other arcane opportunities for great wealth were
accessible only to privileged insiders.126 Although the Supreme Court has rejected the
idea, the prohibition on insider trading has—historically and in the popular imagination—
gained support from the perception that unequal access to information about the markets
is unfair. Such informational disparities correspond to “inequalities in wealth…and
access to human capital in society at large.”127 Jeanne Schroeder has gone so far as to
argue that the “misappropriation” theory of insider trading liability can only be explained
as an expression of envy of those who enjoy trading advantages over the general
public.128
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ITSA and ITSFEA were part of a larger legal preoccupation with insider trading
that included increased prosecutorial action. The rise of insider trading prosecutions may
have been due to changing prosecutorial priorities as much as to changing patterns of
criminal behavior. Tony Poveda has argued that the government concern with whitecollar crime in the 1970s was a broad-based, decentralized response to the
delegitimization of government authority following the Watergate scandal.129 In the
immediate post-Watergate era, the Justice Department and the FBI specifically stated
numerous times that they focused their efforts on white-collar crime in order to restore
confidence in the justice system and the government.130 Poveda notes that the FBI’s
annual report first began including “white-collar crime” as a subheading in 1974. The
first-ever criminal prosecution for insider trading under 10b-5 was brought in 1978,131
and a wave of major prosecutions continued throughout the 1980s. Poveda’s theory is
also consistent with the SEC’s controversial move in the 1970s, under Commissioner
Stanley Sporkin, to take on corporate corruption in addition to its more typically
“regulatory” tasks.
Disparity in wealth is endemic to American society, indeed to most societies
today. By itself, then, the envy argument is an incomplete explanation because it fails to
explain why this populist sentiment resulted in insider trading legislation and not other
legislative changes, such as progressive taxation. Part of the answer is that insider
trading offered Congress an opportunity to cater to the popular envy of wealth without
actually challenging the established economic order. The legitimacy of Democratic
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members of Congress required establishing populist credentials without inflaming too
much resistance from the economic establishment. Republicans, conversely, had to show
that their new deregulatory, pro-business approach would not include a free pass for
abusive practices. Insider trading regulation pleased populists by addressing the
excesses of a small set of wealthy individuals. At the same time, it pleased the Wall
Street establishment because it posed no fundamental challenge to the status quo.
Even the high-profile, highly privileged insider trader villains of the 1980s, bond
traders like Michael Milken, arbitrageurs like Ivan Boesky, and investment bankers like
Dennis Levine, came from relatively less privileged roots than the leaders of established
financial houses and corporations. Indeed, although Fischel blames insider trading
prosecutions on a populist bias against wealth per se, he further contends that the hostile
takeover battles of the 1980s were at least in a part “a struggle between old money and
new money.”132 Milken and Boesky, he argues, made their fortunes by attacking the
economic status quo—which included organized labor as well as established financial
houses and industrial corporations.133 Fischel contends that Milken was the victim of an
“unholy alliance” between the “displaced establishment” and the aforementioned leftist
“rich-haters.”134 While there is no real evidence of any overt conspiracy,135 the
aforementioned conflation of insider trading with hostile takeovers in theCongressional
hearings is consistent with this theory. Portraying insider trading regulation as anti-
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takeover legislation appealed to the Wall Street establishment as well as to populist
sentiment.136
In fact, insider trading regulation cannot be sincerely portrayed as a populist blow
against the wealthy. Like the “white collar crime” movement generally, the insider
trading crusades may have resulted in punishments of “average people” more often than
powerful elites.137 The legislative reforms arguably did little to hold elites responsible.138
And although a number of high-profile prosecutions involved wealthy traders, many lowlevel individuals were prosecuted as well. Rudolph Giuliani, as U.S. Attorney for the
Southern District of New York, brought a large number of insider trading prosecutions
against clerical workers.139 Similarly, the SEC under Shad pursued a “small dollar
program” involving small gains, sometimes less than $10,000.140 Furthermore, John
Fedders, the SEC’s chief of enforcement under Shad, specifically said he thought upper-
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level officers would lack the requisite scienter to be vicariously liable for insider trading
by their employees.141
Unsurprisingly, the insider trading hearings do not contain explicit reference to
resentment of the rich. While politicians may have employed pure anti-capitalist
populism at other times in history,142 that has not been a viable strategy since at least the
dawn of the Cold War. Government’s symbiotic relationship with capitalism and wealth
meant it could not attack the wealthy per se. And in the insider trading hearings,
Congress did not. It reserved its moral critique for “new money”: young, newly wealthy
individuals, whom legislators and witnesses accused of lacking discipline and ethics. The
hearings thus reflected populist resentment against those who quickly obtained wealth
and then acted in an unseemly way. The hearings did not challenge the established order
under which certain individuals and institutions traditionally controlled wealth quietly.
Indeed, members of the Wall Street establishment joined in the condemnation of “new
money.”
Popular culture in the 1980s was fascinated with the “yuppies” who rose from
obscurity to make immense, rapid fortunes in the financial markets; it also delighted in
the eventual downfall of some of them.143 In this context, it is worth considering
Schroeder’s argument that “misappropriation” theory is based on envy of individuals’
141
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good fortune (however isolated or fleeting), as distinct from a more systematic
resentment towards the wealthy as a class.144 There is some anecdotal reflection of this
cultural trope in the hearings. Legislators and witnesses show particular disdain for those
who gain wealth quickly at a relatively young age. They identify this new wealth with
corruption and imply that traditional economic elites have superior moral sense. This
suggests that envy of wealth is particularly intense with respect to “new money.” It is
also consistent with Fischel’s argument that the charge against insider trading and hostile
takeovers was driven (or at least cheered on) by the Wall Street establishment.
Senator D’Amato asserted, “The new players in the market have come into a gogo environment. It appears to them that success is measured in the amount you earn—the
ends always justifying the means.”145 Representative Luken (D-Ohio) suggested that the
1980s saw new kinds of players committing insider trading: “a 23-year old stock broker
or a 27-year-old lawyer, rather than a CEO…the young resourceful people.”146
Representative Wirth (D-Colo.) asserted that “a number of people, especially young
people” have been “moving in and taking advantage of” the bull market.147 He found it
“especially disturbing…that a 33-year old alleged whiz kid earning over $1 million a year
believed he had to steal another $12 million. It is equally disturbing to see five young
men in their twenties using stolen information to line their own pockets….”148 Wirth was
apparently referring to Dennis Levine and the so-called “Yuppie Five,” respectively.149
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Some legislators specifically argued that the Wall Street establishment had moral
standards superior to those of the new financial players. Luken stated that “[t]he
traditional image of the conservative staid, sometimes stony investment banker, has been
replaced by the young, sharp, highly paid MBA who may not have been exposed to the
business ethics or traditions of the past.”150 Similarly, D’Amato called on the securities
industry and corporate law firms to “imbue some sense of morality and ethics into their
young executives and associates….It appears to them that success is measured in the
amount you earn—the ends always justifying the means.”151 Testifying before the senate
Banking Committee, Giuliani cited the “Yuppie Five” defendants as evidence of a failure
to teach ethics to young people.152 George Ball, Chair and CEO of Prudential-Bache
Securities, was even more explicit in his defense of the status quo, stating, “[t]hose 26year-olds just have not been around long enough” to appreciate “what they owed [sic] to
the preservation of the integrity of that system.”153 Thus while the attack on insider
trading may appear to have challenged Wall Street, in fact it can be seen as a defense of
the established economic order and a rebuke to “newcomers,” who are portrayed as
threatening to jeopardize the status quo by overreaching. This rhetorical approach casts
insider traders as disruptivenewcomers and outsiders to an orderly and virtuous
establishment—hardly a populist position.

4. Penalties and Enforcement
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Congress insisted that insider trading activity was rampant, and characterized it as
a law-enforcement matter. Congress thus reduced America’s complex economic
problems to a simplified cops-and-robbers issue. Like the criticism of “new wealth,”
transforming inchoate economic dissatisfaction into a law-enforcement problem also had
an obvious moralistic component. Focusing on insider trading and portraying it as a lawenforcement issue was useful in that it reframed economic policy as an issue of punishing
individual lawbreakers. This transformed a complex set of issues into a simple morality
play with an ostensibly simple solution. It also diverted attention away from more
intractable economic problems, and thereby blunted fundamental questions about the
self-regulatory securities law regime and the market-based economic system generally.
Furthermore, when insider trading is characterized as a law-enforcement issue, it
is ostensibly amenable to solution by relatively simple legislative means—increased
enforcement and stricter penalties. This is not true of more complex economic issues like
hostile takeovers or America’s loss of global industrial competitiveness. Nor is it true of
more complex depictions of insider trading. That is, insider trading is not necessarily a
law-enforcement issue. It may be viewed as a matter of imperfections in the flow of
information to the markets, or the law’s failure to clearly define permissible and
impermissible trading activity. But legislative solutions to those kinds of problems are
much more difficult, both technically and politically. Congress failed to pass a definition
of “insider trading” (and to this day still has not done so). Instead, it left it to the courts
to the define the offense on a painfully slow, case-by-case basis.
As noted above, insider trading regulation was justified in part by the supposed
need to restore investor confidence. A policy emphasis on penalties and enforcement can
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create excessive investor confidence, however. As Donald Langevoort has argued, antifraud regulation is itself potentially “fraudulent” in that it suggests that enforcement
protects the public from investment risk.154 Penalties and enforcement do not necessarily
reduce the incidence of fraud. Moreover, they cannot eliminate it, so some risk of fraud
must be accepted as an inevitable agency cost of investing 155 Moreover, even assuming
that enforcement reduces fraud, investors are constantly exposed to other, more
significant, forms of risk—most obviously, the risk of market downturns. Portfolio
diversification has far more power than anti-fraud measures to mitigate exposure to fraud
or any other risk. Indeed, diversification can reduce risk even if the root causes of risk
(including but not limited to fraud) go unaddressed. The regulatory regime, however,
makes no attempt to educate investors about these basic points. Indeed its focus on
financial disclosure and anti-fraud enforcement can obscure these points. As Langevoort
points out, a passive diversification philosophy conflicts with our faith in the efforts of
active individual investors and investment advisers. And, more importantly in the current
context, it also undermines the perception that legislators and regulators can protect
investors and are necessary to do so.
ITSFEA created a private cause of action for those who trade contemporaneously
with an insider trader. This cause of action, codified as section 20A of the 1934 Act,
does little to increase the overall exposure of insider traders, however. A defendant’s
total liability exposure under section 20A is limited to his profit gained or loss avoided,
and reduced by any disgorgement. There is little incentive to bring suit, as the total
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potential recovery is small, to say nothing of the recovery for any individual plaintiff,
given the potential number of contemporaneous traders of a publicly traded stock.
Section 20A does not create a new class of prohibited conduct, and courts have
interpreted it narrowly.156 The subcommittee draft of ITSFEA had included a provision
authorizing an additional private right of action for any person (not just contemporaneous
traders) injured by the acts of an insider trader.157 This provision was deleted in
committee deliberations, however, due to fear that it would expand civil liability.158
Remarkably, while focusing on penalties, Congress failed to define the offense it
was punishing. The federal securities acts have never defined the offense known as
“insider trading.” Indeed, federal law has no general rule against trading on nonpublic
information. The offense has been constructed by federal court opinions under the
generic antifraud prohibitions of Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder. The judicial definition was (and remains) notoriously murky.
While it seems logically necessary that a definition of the offense should proceed a
discussion of the penalties it entails, the definitional issue proved too technically and
politically difficult. Congress nonetheless pushed ahead with the politically easier task of
increasing maximum penalties. Increasing maximum penalties presented a tough face to
the public, while passing actual responsibility for action from Congress to the courts, the
SEC and the Justice Department.
The Congressional focus on penalties is typical of its symbolic, theatrical
approach to the insider trading issue. Despite lip service to its effect on “investor
156
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confidence,” Congress framed insider trading as an issue of immorality and
punishment—of good versus evil. It could just as well have been framed as, for example,
a failure of preventive measures (such as market surveillance or the 13(d) window), or
even as a type of conduct that is problematic, but marginal. The hearings assume that
additional deterrence is needed, but there is no attempt to calculate the deterrent value of
any specific penalty amounts or structures. Indeed, the deterrent effect of penalties is
unavoidably speculative, as we can never know for certain how much crime does not
occur due to penalty laws. As Dan Kahan has argued:
We will rarely have reliable information on the probability of conviction,
average psychic gains, elasticity of demand, and like variables, the
measurement of which depends on seemingly intractable empirical problems.
Our confidence in the information we do have on these facts will nearly
always be less than the confidence we have in the relative expressive
reprehensibility of diverse wrongs…. Consequently,…the raw expressive
judgments that inform our consequentialist theory of value are much more
likely to dominate the cost-benefit axioms of deterrence than vice-versa.159

Legislators’ focus on penalties is more plausibly explained as an attempt to
express outrage at insider trading, which serves the legitimacy purposes explained above.
Indeed, the very focus on insider trading as a significant economic issue itself makes the
economic dislocations of the 1980s amenable to reframing as issues of identifiable
villains, rather than as inevitable consequences of capitalism and the business cycle. This
is symbolized by the 1987 Senate hearings in which Lynch and Giuliani, the victorious
enforcement agents of the Boesky and Levine cases, were the only witnesses. Even
assuming that insider trading was an issue important enough to merit yet another hearing,
the choice of witnesses is telling. The hearings served little purpose other than to frame
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the insider trading issue as a law enforcement struggle and, moreover, to associate
senators with Lynch and Giuliani, the actual participants in that struggle.160
The point here is not to critique ITSA and ITSFEA’s efficacy in addressing
insider trading. Rather, the point is that they do not even seem genuinely intended to
address insider trading so much as to create the impression of addressing it while
avoiding politically difficult action. The emphasis on law enforcement and penalties had
great rhetorical power in that it reframed vague economic anxieties as narrowly focused
conflicts with identifiable human villains. Furthermore, the law-enforcement approach
relieved Congress of immediate responsibility for solving economic problems and passed
it on to the agencies. This strategy resulted in the odd phenomenon of Congress insisting
that there was an insider trading epidemic, and offering the SEC more power and
resources to combat it, while the SEC insisted that there was no significant problem, that
it did not need additional powers, and that it did not need additional funding.

a. The Failure to Define “Insider Trading”
In two major cases in the early 1980s, the Supreme Court handed victories to
defendants, holding that a judge-made definition of insider trading based on § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 had to be a narrow one that satisfied the common-law definition of fraud.161
The Supreme Court decisions invited Congress to clarify the definition of the offense, but
Congress failed to do so. Indeed, the fundamental ambiguity of “insider trading” may
160
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have been one of the reasons Congress chose it as its proxy for the economic fears of the
1980s. When Congress faces conflicting demands from different interest groups, it may
prefer legislative ambiguity, leaving interpretation to the courts or administrative
agencies.162 This may be a form of compromise to defuse disagreement and allow the
passage of legislation. It also allows individual legislators to avoid displeasing one of the
conflicting interest groups: “…the legislator will be able to assure each group that it
won, and then will be able to blame a court or agency if subsequent developments belie
that assurance.”163 As with the increase in maximum penalties, the appeal of “passing
the buck” may help explain the failure to adopt a definition.
The issue of definition came up in the ITSA hearings, but Shad declined to
discuss the definition or other matters regarding insider trading regulation generally. He
said the bill submitted by the SEC was “very specifically addressed to the treble damage
proposal.”164 In a written memo accompanying his testimony, Shad stated that the SEC
opposed a definition because the case law was sufficiently clear and a new legislative
definition would just create more grounds for litigation.165 Shad showed more interest in
exempting certain kinds of conduct than in creating a broad prohibition:166 the SEC
“urge[s] that the legislative history of the bill cite behavior to which the statute is not
intended to apply.”167 Shad was particularly concerned that an executive who reveals
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information to outsiders “in order to obtain their advice and assistance for the benefit of
his shareholders” not be considered an unlawful “tipper.”168
When ITSA went before the Senate in 1984, Senator D’Amato introduced a
competing bill that included ITSA’s trebling provision, but would also have outlawed all
trading on material nonpublic information.169

Shad took no position on D’Amato’s bill,

stating that the Commission needed time to look at it and compare it to existing law.170
SEC Chief of Enforcement John Fedders was equivocal, presenting six reasons in favor
of a legislative definition of IT and six reasons against.
D’Amato’s broad definition was in direct response to the Supreme Court’s 1980
opinion in United States v. Chiarella. In the absence of a legislative definition of “insider
trading,” the SEC and the Justice Department typically pursue the offense under the
generic anti-fraud provisions of Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5. In
Chiarella, a financial printer obtained the names of impending takeover targets by
reading takeover announcements during the printing process, before their public
dissemination. The government argued that a person who trades in securities without
disclosing that fact that he possessed material nonpublic information has committed
securities fraud. The Court rejected that argument, however, holding that such a trade
does not constitute fraud unless the trader had some independent legal duty to disclose,
such as a fiduciary duty to the counterparty.171 This suggested that while existing law
prohibited insider trading by corporate insiders (such as officers and directors), who owe
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fiduciary duty to their shareholders, it did not reach trading by most “outsiders” who
possess material nonpublic information. Justices Burger and Stevens believed
“outsiders” commit fraud in violation of 10(b) and 10b-5 if they “misappropriate”
material nonpublic information, but the majority of the Court did not address this theory,
as it had not been presented to the jury below.
The committee report accompanying ITSA defended the failure to define insider
trading. According to the report, an explicit definition would be too narrow and create
loopholes. Furthermore, existing case law was sufficiently clear.172 The report supported
this latter contention with reference to cases predating Chiarella, but remarkably failed to
mention Chiarella.173
In summer 1987, in reaction to the wave of insider trading scandals, Congress
again considered a legislative definition of insider trading: S. 1380, the Insider Trading
Proscriptions Act (ITPA).174 Once again, Senator D’Amato was the primary sponsor of
the bill. It would have prohibited the use of information that had been “used or obtained
wrongfully” to trade in securities. Like the 1984 proposal, the proposed definition was
independent of §10(b) and Rule 10b-5, but it was narrower than the earlier proposal. The
ITPA definition was specifically constructed to codify the misappropriation theory of
insider trading liability.175 That theory was indirectly implicated in Carpenter v. U.S.,
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which was pending before the Supreme Court in 1987.176 Carpenter involved charges
under mail fraud, not 10b-5, but turned on the idea that the misuse of information for
trading purposes constituted fraud.
The Chair of the House Energy & Commerce Committee, John Dingell, opposed
ITPA on the ground that a clear proscription would be easier to evade.177 The SEC,
under David Ruder’s chairmanship, proposed its own, substantially similar, version of
ITPA in November 1987.178 The perceived need for ITPA soon abated, however, when
the Supreme Court decided Carpenter late in 1987.179 The Court upheld the defendants’
convictions on mail fraud charges and contained no language undermining the
misappropriation theory.180 ITPA ultimately failed to pass, and ITSFEA, introduced in
June 1988, contained no definition.

b. The SEC’s Restrained Approach to Penalties
Although the SEC drafted the ITSA legislation, Commission officials gave only
lukewarm support to increased penalties. Before ITSA, the only civil sanction for insider
176
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trading was disgorgement of trading profits. At the ITSA hearings, Shad stated that he
wanted the hearings to inform the public that under existing law, insider traders faced a
“host of other sanctions” in addition to disgorgement, including loss of broker-dealer
licenses and criminal sanctions, as well as non-legal sanctions, such as “loss of
employment, social opprobria [sic], [and] heavy legal fees.”181 SEC counsel Dan Goelzer
was wary of increasing civil penalties too much, for fear this “might change the character
of the Commission’s enforcement program, inhibit settlements of the Commission’s
enforcement actions and cause the judiciary to be less receptive to Commission actions
designed to protect the investing public.”182 Goelzer took the position that in the
secondary liability context, the trebling provision should apply narrowly: an employer
should face treble damages only if liable for aiding and abetting, and not merely on the
basis of respondeat superior.183 Shad took an even narrower position, stating that the
SEC’s recommendation was that trebling should apply only to persons who “actually
trade while in possession of material nonpublic information or who tip such information
to others who trade.” 184 “Employers, control persons, and aiders and abettors (other than
tippers)” should not be subject to treble damages under the statute, Shad argued.185
Predictably, issuers, corporate lawyers, and securities firms also favored narrowing
secondary liability.186
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Later, in December 1986 hearings following the Levine and Boesky settlements,
Dingell argued that the treble-penalty provision of ITSA was an insufficient deterrent.
Larger penalties might be necessary, he argued, due to the “unbelievable greed of some in
the marketplace.”187 Representative Luken pointed out that ITSA penalties only work as a
deterrent if they are really being applied. 188 Between the passage of ITSA in 1984 and
summer 1986, the SEC brought 11 cases. It obtained civil penalties in 9 of them, all
pursuant to settlements. According to Shad, “most of the defendants” in these cases were
required to disgorge their profits and pay a penalty equal to the amount of profit.189 In
the largest and most notorious insider trading case, Dennis Levine’s settlement involved
no penalty, requiring only disgorgement of $11 million in profits and cooperation in
further investigation, which ultimately yielded little. One defendant, First Boston
Corporation, paid a penalty equal to twice the amount of profit. No defendant paid the
treble penalty authorized by ITSA.190
William J. Anderson, the GAO’s Assistant Comptroller General for General
Government Programs, testified that as of Sept. 30, 1986, the full treble damages
permitted under ITSA had never been imposed in any case.191 In fiscal 1985, penalties
in excess of disgorgement were imposed in only 2 of 12 civil actions. The penalties
imposed were less than the profits disgorged. Penalties were imposed in 15 of 30 actions
in 1986. Penalties in those cases ranged from .01 times profits to 2.36 times profits. As a
partial explanation, the SEC told GAO that it considers a defendant’s ability to pay when
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requesting penalties.192 Shad proudly testified that in calendar 1986 as of December 11,
SEC civil cases had obtained court orders for $80 million in disgorgements and $54
million in penalties193—note, however, that this aggregate penalty amount is far less than
the maximum permitted under the treble damages provision.
After ITSA, Shad did not believe any further insider trading sanctions were
necessary. He argued that “ITSA, by supplementing other civil, administrative and
criminal sanctions, provides substantial deterrence of insider trading.”194 Of course,
such a contention is non-falsifiable. Shad also argued that the major cases like Levine
and Boesky had triggered a number of SEC investigations into related activity, and it
would be “premature” to consider additional insider trading laws while those
investigations were in progress.195
Shad and his SEC showed no interest in severe punishment of insider trading.
Both the Levine and Boesky settlements were criticized at the time as weak.196 Dennis
Levine was arrested in May 1986. and in early June, he pleaded guilty to four felonies.
Levine settled SEC civil charges by agreeing to disgorge $11.6 million in trading profits,
a permanent injunction from future securities law violations and a lifetime ban from the
securities industry.197 In the July 1986 hearings, legislators asked Shad why Levine did
not pay any civil penalties under ITSA. At least some of Levine’s trading occurred
before the effective date of ITSA, but Shad did not rely on that fact. Rather, he explained
by stating that Levine “disgorged $11.6 million and agreed to cooperate in the
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Commission’s continuing investigation. He also simultaneously pled guilty to four
felony counts.” 198 The Justice Department, which cooperated extensively with the SEC
in the Levine investigation, was no more severe. In 1986, Shad told Congress that the
maximum penalties Levine faced were 20 years in prison and $610,000 in fines.199 But
when Levine was finally sentenced, he received only 2 years and $362,000 in fines.200
Luken argued that the practice of giving leniency in exchange for testifying against others
undermined the deterrent effect of sanctions.201
Gary Lynch, the SEC’s head of enforcement, testified that Boesky’s $100 million
settlement consisted of a $50 million disgorgement and a $50 million penalty—again, far
less than the maximum treble damages. (Boesky also agreed to plead guilty to criminal
charges, resulting in a three-year jail sentence.202) Part of Boesky’s settlement with the
SEC and federal prosecutors barred Boesky from association with a broker-dealer—but
the bar was stayed “to permit an orderly transfer of control of Boesky’s current
businesses.”203 Moreover, the government promised to withhold the announcement of
the settlement so that Boesky could quietly liquidate his positions before their prices
crashed. In effect, the government’s settlement terms enabled him to avoid enormous
losses by trading on material nonpublic information—the news of his own guilty plea and
settlement. In response to that issue, Shad pointed out that the SEC did not want to roil
the markets. He also invoked the Supreme Court’s narrow definition of insider trading:
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although Boesky had nonpublic information, his trading was not illegal because he
violated no duty of disclosure, and thus did not violate Rule 10b-5.204
Later in the same hearing, Luken questioned whether Boesky’s fine would really
have a deterrent effect. He asked whether the SEC had investigated Boesky’s assets and
ability to pay before setting the penalty at $50 million. Lynch evaded the question for a
while, but Luken finally demanded a response. Lynch appeared to concede that he had
not performed such an investigation: “It was our judgment that we ought to settle the
matter and get on about our business, [get] him as a cooperating witness and try to clean
up some of the abuses.”205
John Shad had been succeeded by David Ruder by the time Congress considered
ITSFEA. Ruder did not initially support most of ITSFEA. His testimony in July 1988
was critical of the legislation. He was ambivalent about extending ITSA’s trebling
provision to “control persons” of insider traders because he believed that “[e]xisting
incentives in this area are already substantial.”206 He also noted that the SEC had already
approved New York Stock Exchange rule changes increasing supervisory requirements in
member firms.207 He stated that this SRO-based approach was “more comprehensive”
and thus “more desirable” than ITSFEA’s imposition of control-person liability.208
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Ruder also expressed concern that ITSFEA’s private cause of action for
contemporaneous traders might place excessive liability on defendants, since exposure
would derive from arbitrary factors like trading volume.209 At the time of the hearing, the
committee print of the bill placed no cap on total damages in a private action. Ruder
argued that this uncapped liability was potentially “Draconian.”210 Ruder also argued
that ITSFEA’s proposed increase in criminal monetary penalties was unnecessary, and
that the existing five-year maximum jail term was the most important criminal penalty
(ITSFEA increased the maximum to ten years).211 When pressed on his views on the
bounty provision, Ruder said he had “always been troubled by the bounty concept”
because he opposed paying people “for doing what they already should be doing.”212
Ruder did support section 6, which authorized SEC to conduct investigations in
response to a foreign government’s request for assistance in investigating violations of
that country’s securities laws.213 Ruder thought this was the most important part
ITSFEA, because it would help foreign prosecutions and encourage foreign governments
to cooperate with the SEC. Dennis Levine, for example, had done his insider trading
through an offshore account, and his scheme was discovered thanks to tips from abroad.
Ruder also supported ITPA, the proposed definition of insider trading, which ultimately
failed.214 He submitted his unenthusiastic written comments on ITSFEA into the record
and then invited discussion on other proposed reforms.215
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Other than capping liability in private suits, Congress did not respond to Ruder’s
criticisms of ITSFEA. Ruder suddenly changed his position on the bill just before it was
passed. When asked about his view of the bill in September 1988, he said “I personally
support the bill.” Despite his earlier insistence that increased penalties were unnecessary,
he stated, “I think that increases in sanctions in the insider trading area will be helpful
and effective in deterring that kind of conduct.”216 It is unclear what prompted Ruder’s
change in position. Despite his late support, however, note that Congress drafted most
provisions of the bill, including its increase in SEC discretion with respect to “control
person” penalties, despite Ruder’s opposition.

c. Enforcement Resources
Shad initially opposed Congressional plans to expand the SEC’s budget,
particularly in the enforcement area. 217 He insisted that the SEC could perform its
enforcement mission without larger budgets. In the Senate hearings on ITSA, Proxmire
asked Shad why he did not seek additional appropriations for enforcement.218 Shad
responded by stating that the Enforcement Division had brought an increased number of
cases in fiscal 1982, despite a reduction in staff, and another increase in 1983 despite no
growth in staff.219 Shad acknowledged that there was always the possibility of
undetected violations that could be prosecuted with more resources, but he expressed less
concern about under-enforcement than about cost-benefit analysis in an era of budget
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deficits. He also stated, as he had in the House hearings, that no law enforcement agency
can ever know how many violations are going undetected.220
In 1985, when the SEC requested authorizations before the Senate Appropriations
Committee, SEC representatives mentioned ITSA in passing as an achievement to be
proud of, but did not mention insider trading enforcement as a justification for its
budget.221 In accordance with the Reagan budget, Shad did not ask Congress for
increases in SEC funding.222 Shad’s testimony focused on the recent failures of
government securities dealers, raising questions about whether closer regulation was
needed, and also on the pending deregulation of financial services that would increase the
number of institutions subject to SEC regulation.223 Senators Alan Cranston (C-Calif.),
Sasser, and Proxmire, however, showed great interest in enforcement actions, however,
asking Shad whether the SEC was being aggressive enough.224 Proxmire asked why
Shad was not asking for more money for enforcement. Shad replied that Reagan’s 1986
budget was sufficient.225
This seems to belie the conventional wisdom that Democrats favor “regulatory”
approaches to securities law while Republicans favor deregulation and stiffer
enforcement of the most egregious conduct. Rather, agency chief Shad (a Republican)
seems more interested in regulation while these politicians (all Democrats) seem more
interested in enforcement. This makes sense, as enforcement is much easier for
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politicians to understand, and makes a more dramatic statement to the public about the
government’s commitment to imposing discipline on the markets.

d. Legislative Expansion of Executive Discretion
Even assuming that increased penalties were an appropriate response to an insider
trading “epidemic,” the increase in penalties under ITSA and ITSFEA was more
apparent than real. The treble-damages provision of ITSA did not include any mandatory
increases in penalties. Rather, it only increased the maximum civil sanction, authorizing
courts to award up to three times profits as a penalty. ITSFEA expanded this discretion
to the control person context. Similarly, ITSA and ITSFEA sequentially raised maximum
criminal fines, but not minima. The Committee Report on ITSFEA stated that “courts
should impose jail terms” for insider trading, and that it “expects that raising the ceiling
will increase the certainty of substantial prison sentences,”226 but in fact ITSFEA did
nothing to require jail time. Similarly, as Shad himself pointed out to Congress, “ITSA
does not require that a civil penalty be imposed in every case, nor does it provide specific
criteria to be used in determining the amount of the penalty to be imposed…The
determination of those facts and circumstances which justify imposing the maximum
penalty will ultimately be made by the judiciary as precedents are established.”227
Increasing the range of penalties does not directly increase penalties imposed on
wrongdoers; it only increases the discretion of the enforcement agencies that recommend
sanctions and the courts that impose them.
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ITSA and ITSFEA further expanded executive power by giving the SEC
discretion to exempt “any person or transaction or class of persons or transactions” from
their penalty provisions.228 Neither the ITSA nor ITSFEA hearings include consideration
of mandatory minimum penalties or other restrictions on SEC discretion. Furthermore,
the failure to pass a legislative definition put the definition of insider trading in the hands
of SEC rulemaking and the charging decisions of SEC civil enforcers and Justice
Department prosecutors (subject, of course, to judicial review).
The fact that Congress “reformed” insider trading law by expanding the discretion
of executive agencies is remarkable in light of the clear difference in philosophy between
the Democratically-controlled Congress and the Republican Administration. Congress
and the SEC sharply disagreed about the scope of the insider trading problem, the
appropriateness of harsher penalties and the need for more enforcement resources. This
was not a matter of political compromise, in which Congress ceded discretion to a
powerful executive. Rather, it was a matter of buck-passing, for ITSA and ITSFEA both
gave the SEC power it did not seem to want.
As noted above, the trebling provision of ITSA had never been applied as of
1986. Furthermore, the SEC gave only grudging support to ITSA, the Commission’s
own bill, and refused to support ITSFEA until the eleventh hour. After ITSA, the SEC
did not seek any further discretion in penalty matters. In 1985 hearings, Senator
Proxmire asked Shad whether the SEC should be given increased power to set civil fines.
Shad said it was not necessary, because ITSA was sufficient.229 He repeated the caution
expressed in the ITSA hearings—that high penalties might reduce judicial willingness to
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go along with SEC penalties, might increase defendants’ willingness to litigate, and that
the SEC needed time to see whether ITSA was working.230 Despite all this, Congress
followed ITSA with ITSFEA, extending treble penalties, and the concomitant executive
discretion, to the control-person context. Congress’s continued failure to define the
offense put the direction of the “war” on insider trading even further out of Congressional
control and more squarely in the hands of the SEC, the Justice Department, and the
courts. As noted above, Congress praised Shad and his SEC for their enforcement efforts
even as Shad and other Commission officials testified that insider trading was not a
significant problem. Indeed, Congress seemed to protest too much when it included in
ITSFEA’s preamble a statement that the SEC had been enforcing the existing rules
against insider trading “vigorously, effectively, and fairly.”231 Congress did not call
attention to Shad’s lukewarm attitude toward insider trading enforcement: if it were to do
so, it could not justify “passing the buck” to the SEC.

V. CONCLUSION
Most current legal commentary on corporate and securities regulation (such as the
wealth of excellent work on Sarbanes-Oxley), focuses on whether a regulatory approach
succeeded, or will succeed, in improving economic welfare (however that may be
defined). The focus of this article is very different. Focusing on the front end rather
than the back, it is not concerned with the economic effects that securities regulation
produces, but with the political motivations that produce it. This inquiry suggests that
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economic regulation is the product of Congress’s concern for its own perpetuation as an
institution and not the result of its sober calculations of economic effects.
Lawmaking is a process as well as a product. Legal commentators tend to focus
on the product. Legal scholarship’s traditional bias toward judge-made lawover
legislation exacerbates this tendency, since the process of writing judicial opinions is
largely inaccessible to scholars. Legislators, speaking and writing for the record, are
literally performing to communicate to their colleagues, for the edification of society, and
to the voters. While much has been written on the “expressive” function of law, this
commentary tends to view law as the expression of publicvalues. But this view
necessarily presumes that the legislators (or judges) who make the law are a frictionless
conduit of public values. More skeptical views of lawmaking see legislators as boughtand-paid-for conduits not of the public interest, but of “special interests.” Those (such as
Richard Fenno) who do consider the autonomy of legislators tend focus on them as
classical rational actors seeking individual gain. I suggest that legislators may use their
autonomy to legitimate the existing political and economic order. While this theory is
consistent with a characterization of politicians as cynical lackeys of capitalism, it is just
as consistent with legislators who are sincere believers in the American establishment.
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